D. The Only List they Could be Talking About

Because it had been accused by the White House of providing inaccurate lists for use by the White House Security Office, the Secret Service undertook an exhaustive audit of their E-Pass system and any lists that may have been provided to the White House. At hearings before this committee, the Secret Service spoke in detail about the lists available to the White House.(558)

Agent Libonati described the information which led to the search for mistakes in Secret Service lists. Agent Libonati told the committee, "Upon receipt of two lists which total 476 individuals [whose FBI background files the White House obtained improperly] the Secret Service set out to determine if, in fact, we had provided ANY LIST which would have inaccurately reflected any or all of these 476 names as ACTIVE passholders in 1993 or 1994."(559) And because, according to Libonati, [t]he Secret Service has for many years provided printouts containing passholder information to the White House Office of Personnel Security," Libonati characterized the issue before the Secret Service in the following manner: "Did the Secret Service produce and/or provide any list or lists which would have inaccurately reflected these 476 individuals as ACTIVE passholders?" Libonati presented to the committee evidence uncovered by the Secret Service search and audit of their files, which clearly demonstrated that the Secret Service could not have provided such a list.(560)

The Secret Service conducted an exhaustive audit of its records. Libonati told the committee, "The audit confirms that from 1984 to July of 1993, 379 of the 476 names on the subject list were made Inactive. We can account for 8 errors . . ."(561) Names were made inactive only at the request of the White House. However, many of the names mentioned above were entered into the E-Pass system when it was installed, and they were entered as Inactive. Thus, at no time were many of the names on the list of 476 in the E-Pass system as active passholders.

Libonati recounted before the committee the evidence uncovered by the Secret Service in their search for lists produced by the E-Pass system at certain times. According to Libonati, the evidence showed:

o Ninety-four of the names of the 476 on the list were inactivated between 1984 and 1989, before we installed our current E-Pass system.(562)

o In a printout of inactive passholders, the evidence shows that "182 of the 476 names in question appear as they should on this inactive printout."(563)

o In a printout of active passholders from May 2, 1994, "368 of the 476 names in question do not appear on this list, and they should not appear on this list. This is an active passholder list."(564)

o In a printout of active passholders as of July 31, 1993, "379 of the 476 names in question do not appear on this list."(565)

o In a printout of inactive passholders as of August 19, 1994, 429 of the 476 names in question do and should appear on this inactive list."(566)

o In a March 31, 1993 active passholder list provided to the committee by the White House, 408 of the 476 names are not on the list. In addition, the name of Elizabeth Belfore was not on the March 31, 1993 list, but is among the 476 people whose background files were requested by the White House. Belfore did not receive a pass until after July 8, 1993.(567)

The data compiled by the Secret Service clearly demonstrated that the only way Marceca could have obtained all of the names he sought files on would have been by utilizing a master list with both "Active" and "Inactive" employees, with the notations "A" and "I" clearly indicated on the printout. In using the master list, Marceca would have had to deliberately order the files of hundreds of individuals identified as "Inactive." Agent Cole testified that he briefed Marceca's supervisor, Livingstone, on the "Active" and "Inactive" list notations:

Question. You would have meetings where you instructed_I believe you testified you instructed Craig Livingstone on procedures and how to get material from your office and get updated lists, that type of thing?

Answer. Yes, we have had conversations about that.

Question. In terms of reading the lists, what "A" and "I" meant, active and inactive; that kind of thing had been explained to Mr. Livingstone?

Answer. Yes.(568)

Marceca has testified that he believed the designations, "A" and "I" on the Secret Service lists meant "Access" and "Intern."(569) To believe this story, one would have to accept that Marceca, whose involvement in political campaigns is extensive, believed that such well known former White House officials as James Baker, A.B. Culvahouse, Ken Duberstein and many others were "holdover interns," a category of passholders which does not exist.

Another fact uncovered by the Secret Service discredits Marceca's explanation that he was working with an old, or outdated list. One of the names on the list of files he obtained, Elizabeth Belfore, did not begin working at the White House until July 1993. Thus, any list Marceca worked from which included her name was created after this date. Since Marceca did not begin working at the White House until August 1993, it is apparent that he must have used a list created during that time period. A list made at that time would not have included most of the names of individuals whose files were eventually requisitioned by the White House.

E. Deactivation

At hearings before the committee, committee members questioned why some former administration employees remained as active passholders in the Secret Service E-Pass System. Libonati and Cole explained that it is the responsibility of the White House to inform the Secret Service when an employee's status should change from active to inactive.

Libonati made the process of deactivation of passes clear in his opening statement:

A pass is also made inactive solely at the request of the White House. It is the responsibility of each administration to identify those pass holders whom they wish to remove from the active passholder list. Regardless of how obvious it may seem to anyone in the Secret Service, we cannot, should not, and do not inactivate a pass without clear instruction from the administration.(570)

After Libonati's explanation, Congresswoman Collins, the ranking minority member of the committee, was still confused about the process used to deactivate a pass.

Mrs. Collins of Illinois. Could you explain to me why Senator Tower, who had died 2 years earlier in a plane crash, still had an active White House pass in '93?

Mr. Cole. Because [the May 27, 1993 memorandum] was the first notice we got from the White House to deactivate his pass.

Mrs. Collins. Did you know he had died?

Mr. Cole. I wasn't aware of the fact that he had a White House Pass, Ma'am.

Mrs. Collins. Did you know he had died?

Mr. Cole. Yes.

Mrs. Collins. Does anybody ever cull the lists to take out people who are deceased?

Mr. Cole. The requirement for deactivation of passes that is the same requirement that took place for Vincent Foster, that we would have to have someone from the White House to tell us to deactivate it. It is obvious that person would not pose a threat to the complex, because they are deceased.

Mrs. Collins. Why would you have to have somebody tell you to deactivate a file of somebody that the Service knows is not going to use it?

Mr. Cole. Because that documentation belongs to the White House.

Although White House staff feigned ignorance of it, the process of deactivation of passes for deceased or retiring personnel was well known to the White House Security Office. The fact that Livingstone made the request that the Secret Service deactivate Senator Tower's pass establishes his knowledge of the process of updating the Secret Service access list as a White House responsibility.(571) Other evidence points to the fact that Livingstone was well acquainted with the process of removing Bush administration officials from Secret Service access lists.

In a confidential memorandum from Craig Livingstone to William Kennedy, Livingstone notes, "Please note that there are many Bush administration employees that still have active badges. USSS informs me that it is WHS responsibility to deactivate badges. I am working with WHOMA to begin this process." Because of information contained in the memorandum, it's date appears to be between March 4, 1993 and March 15, 1993.(572)

Documents dated August 9, 1993 include notes made by Marceca from a meeting with Nancy Gemmell that included Lisa Wetzl and Craig Livingstone. In those notes, Marceca writes, "De-Activate former staff FBI contact to remove STOP on [illegible]."(573) The White House staff was clearly familiar with the process of updating Secret Service lists and the language associated with it.

In addition to the notes and memoranda of Livingstone and Marceca, testimony before the committee also points to the fact that the staff of the White House Security Office was aware of the process for deactivating White House passholders. In his deposition to the committee, Agent Cole stated that he briefed Livingstone on such matters.

Livingstone and Marceca knew the process of deactivating White House access passes was a primary function of their jobs, and they were fully briefed on the process required to do that. Nonetheless, they tried to blame the Secret Service for their malfeasance. Because of their attempts to shift the blame, the Secret Service was forced to spend countless hours and resources responding to inquiries and allegations. The only logical conclusion to the audits conducted, was that no active Secret Service list could have produced the list of names of those whose FBI files were wrongfully requested by the White House.

IX. White House Passes and Security Issues

A. Lax White House Security Procedures Were a Precursor to FBI Files Issue

1. Problems with White House passes

The gathering of hundreds of FBI files was a consequence of the White House placing highly unsuitable personnel and supervisors in charge of the Security processes at the White House. The fact that the Clinton White House followed lax security procedures and was negligent in obtaining White House passes became apparent over 2 years ago, in March 1994, after lengthy congressional inquiries.

A GAO inquiry into the delays in obtaining White House passes was requested by Chairman Clinger, and Representatives Frank Wolf and Porter Goss in March 1994, and released in October 1995. The GAO report outlined the unprecedented delays of the Clinton White House in obtaining passes.(574) In keeping with the Clinton administration's pattern of resistance to investigations, the GAO inquiry examining the delays in obtaining the passes was met with numerous obstacles for over a year.(575)

When the GAO inquiry finally concluded, it reported the following findings:

o A mere two permanent passes received final approval prior to September 20, 1993_9 months into the new administration.(576) (In the past, permanent White House passes were obtained for all staff by approximately 6 to 9 months into a new administration.(577) )

o In 1993, new Clinton White House staffers held temporary passes for an average of 341 days, thus requiring numerous renewals. (A temporary pass is usually issued for 90 days.) (578)

o In 1993, the Secret Service stated that it routinely granted eight or more extensions to individuals for temporary passes as requested by the Executive Office of the President.(579)

o There were 190 new Clinton White House staffers who took more than 100 days to complete the SF-86_the basic paperwork needed for the FBI to initiate a background investigation.(580)

o There were 36 new Clinton White House staffers who took over 300 days_almost a year_to complete their SF-86s.(581)

o Of the 400 staff entering on duty during 1993, 250 took over 300 days to be approved for permanent passes.(582)

o In 1993, 361 of 398 individuals took 200 days or more to be approved for a permanent pass.(583)

o Only about two dozen staffers had "interim clearances" according to the White House in the first 8 months of the administration.(584)

o Individuals entering on duty during 1993 received final approval for permanent White House passes "an average of 346 days from their start date."(585)

o "The longer time needed to process 1993 entrants was primarily attributable to the time individuals took to complete the SF-86 and to subsequent actions taken by the Executive Office of the President."(586)

When White House advisor George Stephanopoulos was questioned about the problems with obtaining passes during "This Week with David Brinkley," on June 30, 1996, he erroneously claimed:

Stephanopoulos. Well most people did go get their interviews. Most people got their passes. If there was slippage, that was a mistake. It was wrong.

Sam Donaldson. Aldrich [FBI agent Gary Aldrich] says hundreds.

Stephanopoulos. Well, I'm not sure that's true . . . I don't have the exact number.

According to a White House memo from Craig Livingstone, Stephanopoulos' temporary pass was renewed for an additional 90 days on December 13, 1993.(587) Stephanopoulos, like most of the White House staff at that time, had numerous renewals of his temporary pass.

The GAO inquiry was preceded by months of congressional inquiries into the inordinate delay in obtaining White House passes.(588) Senior officials, including the then-Chief of Staff Mack McLarty, did not obtain permanent passes until March 1994. Once this serious security breach of the Clinton administration was brought to light in March 1994, the White House was forced to respond.

The press began reporting on the delays in the issuance of permanent White House passes in early 1994. On March 10, 1994, the Wall Street Journal first pointed out that the White House had not approved passes for senior White House officials such as the Director of the Office of Administration, Patsy Thomasson.(589) This article appears to have generated a memo from Associate Counsel William Kennedy to Mack McLarty explaining the procedures to receive a permanent pass.(590) The next day the Washington Post reported that, "15 White House aides, including press secretary Dee Dee Myers and another unidentified senior official, have yet to receive security clearances because they failed to complete necessary paperwork . . ."(591)

By March 12, 1994, the White House conceded that the situation was actually much worse than it originally admitted and that hundreds of staff did not have permanent passes: "White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers . . . confirmed that about a third of the 1044 employees designated as White House staff, including herself, have not received their permanent passes."(592) Of the 125 senior staff, approximately one-third still did not have their permanent passes.(593) By March 14, 1994, the White House raised the number of officials who did not have security clearances to 100 rather than the 15 individuals originally reported.(594) Clearly, the responses provided to Congress by McLarty were misleading, incomplete and inaccurate.(595)

Ms. Jane Dannenhauer, Assistant to the Counsel to the President in charge of the Security Office during the Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush administrations, reported that a new administration normally completed its pass issuance within approximately 6 months, or at most 9 months.(596) In comparison, the GAO reported that only two Clinton staffers had permanent passes 9 months into the administration.(597) Messrs. Kennedy and Livingstone, who were responsible for White House pass issuance, did not obtain their own passes until November 23, 1993.(598)

2. Unsuitable personnel in charge of overseeing the Office of Personnel Security

While the committee and the public have yet to learn who hired Craig Livingstone, the committee discovered information on the hiring of his supervisor, William Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy testified that Mrs. Clinton participated in his selection as Associate White House Counsel.(599) At the time of his background investigation, Kennedy informed the FBI's SPIN Unit Chief Bourke that he was a "close personal friend of the President and Mrs. Clinton for twenty years and was a managing partner in the same Arkansas law firm in which Mrs. Clinton was employed."(600)

Mr. Kennedy, in his position as an Associate Counsel, reviewed the sensitive background investigations of Presidential appointees and White House staff, including Director of Personnel Security Craig Livingstone. Although Kennedy supervised Livingstone's office and was aware of problems in Livingstone's background, he favorably adjudicated his file.(601)

Mr. Kennedy had background problems of his own. Mr. Kennedy did not properly disclose his failure to pay Social Security taxes for a servant in his home. He paid the taxes belatedly under his wife's former married name.(602) Just as Kennedy had ignored the problems in Livingstone's background, Livingstone adjudicated Kennedy's background favorably, ignoring the derogatory information.(603) Although each had completed the adjudication of the other's file, Kennedy did not forward either his or Livingstone's file to the Secret Service for months.(604)

Four Counsels to the President and two Chiefs of Staff kept Mr. Livingstone in his position despite serious concerns about his background. Livingstone was retained despite his penchant for short working hours and routine demands for large salary increases. Keeping Craig Livingstone employed seemed more important to Clinton administration officials than maintaining the security of some of the Nation's most sensitive files.(605)

Former White House Counsels have testified that the process of reviewing FBI files "is a solemn, legal and ethical obligation."(606) After the committee discovered that the Office of Personnel Security ordered the files of hundreds of former Reagan and Bush administration officials, the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, called the actions "egregious violations of privacy."(607) Director Freeh continued to state that the files were ordered "without justification."(608) As Director Freeh pointed out, the system utilized relied on the "good faith and honor" of those involved in the process.(609) As the Washington Post opined on June 17, 1996:

. . . damage was done from Day 1 when Craig Livingstone was

put in this job. The last people in government to have access to, let alone be custodians of, sensitive background investigation reports and material should be political operatives. That, unfortunately, is what the Clinton administration seems to have done. And that's for starters.(610)

FBI Special Agent Tom Renaghan, who supervised the FBI agents who conducted background investigations at the White House, remembered issues in Livingstone's background:

that were not totally favorable . . . they [FBI agents Aldrich and Sculimbrene who conducted background investigations at the White House] both felt that he wasn't the right guy to be the Security Director. They didn't think he had the background or demeanor, didn't appear to be the kind of guy that would be the type of person that would be_you would expect in that position . . . He was unprofessional in many ways, as unprofessional as they would perceive a guy to be who had that type of a job. . . . They voiced their opinion to me about that periodically asking me to take some kind of action to get something done with respect to him.(611)

Mr. Kennedy allowed Livingstone to retain his sensitive position after reviewing Livingstone's background file. Although both FBI and Secret Service agents raised suitability and security concerns about Livingstone, Kennedy ignored them.(612) Senator Dennis DeConcini, the then-Democratic chairman of the Treasury Postal Service and General Government Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, which approved appropriations for the White House, as well as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, recommended that Livingstone be replaced in 1994 with a professional careerist. Senator DeConcini's recommendations were ignored by then-White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler.(613)

B. The Process by Which Background Investigations Are Conducted

The process for obtaining a permanent access pass to the White House generally requires the following steps:

1. Pre-employment steps

a. Security interview

Prior to each person's appointment, applicants must undergo a security interview conducted by the relevant security office.(614) In the case of the political staff, generally the "White House staff," the interview would be conducted by the Office of Personnel Security, supervised by Livingstone. For the career staff, the Office of Administration Security Officer would conduct the interviews.(615) During the first year-and-a-half of the Clinton administration, hundreds of employees did not submit to this interview prior to employment, or for many months after being hired.(616)

b. Submit to a drug test

All applicants must submit to a drug test. If the test is positive, the person is supposed to be disqualified from appointment.(617) Many of the new employees in the Clinton administration did not take drug tests prior to employment at the White House, and they were often conducted months later.

c. An initial name check

Applicants must undergo an initial name check in which their name, date of birth, place of birth, and Social Security number are checked through the Secret Service's Workers, Appointment, and Visitors Entrance System (WAVES). This consists of checks through four computer databases: the FBI's National Crime Information Center database; a criminal history database; a Secret Service database; and a Washington-area law enforcement database.(618) This is the type of name check that is conducted for visitors at the White House. For many Clinton White House staff in the first year-and-a-half, this was the only background check conducted on them.

d. An extensive FBI name check

In this process, the White House forwards a request form to the FBI to check the name through the FBI Central Records, computer databases and the Criminal Justice Information Services database to identify any derogatory information and prior arrest records.(619) Any previous report is also provided if the individual already has an FBI background investigation on file.

e. Obtaining a temporary pass

Each new employee who is expected to work 90 days or more has 30 days from the date of employment in which to complete the SF-86, an FBI investigation consent form, and a tax check waiver.(620) This 30 day standard was the regular practice in past administrations; however, there was no such legal requirement.

Mr. Charles Easley, who headed up the Security Office for career employees at the White House, stated that if someone did not turn in their SF-86s and other background information within 30 days, "they had a lot of time to sit at home and do their forms" because he would not allow someone to work at the White House.(621) Mr. Easley said that this was not the case for the staff handled by Livingstone. Easley acknowledged that he was aware that Livingstone allowed staff to work at the White House and obtain a temporary pass without turning in paperwork, a change in normal procedure.(622)

Previously, the practice had been that an individual had to stay on an "access list" prior to completing the SF-86 and related paperwork, which meant the person would have to present positive identification each time he or she entered the White House complex.(623) Once the FBI name check is returned, the individual would be issued a temporary pass for a period not to exceed 90 days. After one extension, the Secret Service is supposed to contact the requesting office to provide a rationale for an additional extension.(624) Each new employee also is required to attend a security briefing at which his or her attendance should be documented.(625)

f. Obtaining a permanent pass

Before a permanent pass is obtained, the FBI or some other agency must conduct a full-field background investigation. If the investigation reveals information that warrants attention, the FBI notifies the White House Counsel's Office, the White House Office of Personnel Security, or the Security Office of the EOP (administered by Charles Easley) and might provide an interim report.(626)

Once the reviewing office receives the FBI background investigation summary, it determines suitability and decides whether to forward the file to the Secret Service. A written request is sent to the Secret Service for a permanent access pass for the employee and, if the Secret Service agrees there is no danger to the President or other protectees, a permanent pass is issued.(627)

During the first year-and-a-half of the Clinton administration, this process was neglected and hundreds of new White House staff worked in positions, including the most senior positions, with only very limited checks on their backgrounds and no permanent passes. The importance of following procedures and determining the suitability of staff members is to protect both the President, personally, and the vast amount of sensitive information at the White House.

At no place is it more important that individuals of the highest caliber serve in positions of responsibility than at the White House. The White House handles matters of life and death on a daily basis and the American people must be able to rely upon stable and suitable people being involved in this process. Because the White House had failed in this process, Presidential Assistant Patsy Thomasson made this alarming admission in her March 22, 1994 testimony before the House Treasury Postal Appropriations subcommittee: "We don't think we have any Aldrich Ameses at the White House . . . But we certainly could."(628)

This admission prompted then-Congressman Dan Glickman, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee to write to the Director of the CIA asking what steps he had taken to ensure that White House staffers without clearances did not have access to classified material.(629) Representative Glickman noted at the time, "The urgency of this matter has been highlighted by the arrest of Aldrich Ames."(630) Early in the administration, there was cause for concern about White House personnel.

C. Background Investigations of Clinton White House Staff

1. White House staff provided minimal cooperation to the FBI

The FBI agents who worked on a day-to-day basis in conducting FBI background investigations on the new Clinton White House staffers were very familiar with the delays in obtaining White House passes. From the start, the process was slower than with previous administrations and staff cooperation was liminted.

FBI Agent Dennis Sculimbrene testified that the incoming administration usually starts sending cases on Cabinet-level personnel and appointees in December, before the Presidential Inauguration. But that did not occur with the Clinton administration.(631) Agent Sculimbrene said there was a marked contrast with this administration: "the forms were poorly filled out and they didn't even start getting them until July."(632) When they received the forms, they were often backdated.(633)

Agent Sculimbrene's supervisor, Tom Renaghan, also reported that backgrounds were received late and were backdated.(634) FBI Agent Cecelia Woods, another agent assigned to the White House, reported that she saw the dates on SF-86s visibly changed and received SF-86s sometimes 8 months after they had been completed by the appointee.(635)

FBI Agent Greg Schwarz testified that he had trouble setting up interviews or getting people to appear for interviews and was aware of this happening to other agents at the White House.(636) Agent Woods testified that Renaghan, her supervisor, advised Unit Chief Bourke of these irregularities and that Bourke should have discussed the problems with Associate White House Counsel Bill Kennedy.(637) Woods, however, never saw any corrective actions taken on issues she or her colleagues raised with her supervisors.(638)

FBI Agent Gary Aldrich explained that he had problems conducting background interviews, including: problems in locating individuals, an inability to contact them directly and appointments being made and broken.(639) As a result of these problems, Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster sent out a memo to all staff on February 17, 1993 instructing them to cooperate with FBI Agents Aldrich and Sculimbrene. Mr. Foster wrote:

There are a large number of staff members yet to be interviewed and only a few weeks left to complete them before your temporary clearance expires. Please be responsive to the Agent's request for an interview and accommodate his schedule.(640)

There was such laxity in submitting the names of new White House staff for background investigations that Bourke resorted to clipping newspaper articles which identified new staffers and sending them to Bill Kennedy with notes that the FBI had not received the backgrounds of the individuals named.(641)

Agent Bourke's letters to Kennedy highlight the fact that the FBI had not been provided information on many top White House officials as late as October 1993. In an April 7, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy, Bourke wrote: "I read an article in the April 6, 1993, edition of USA Today on Jocelyn Elders. It reminded me that we still do not have the paperwork to do her background investigation (BI)."(642) At the same time that the White House was negligent in obtaining background investigations on new White House staff members, Livingstone and Marceca were ordering the background investigations on former Reagan and Bush officials.

2. Problems in the background investigations of Clinton administration staff

Almost immediately FBI agents reviewing the background files of the new Clinton White House officials noticed significant problems. According to Sculimbrene, the problems in the backgrounds included, "using illegal drugs repetitively, lying to law enforcement officers, lying about school records, being fired."(643)

Agent Sculimbrene noted that the drug use was by "older people who had used illegal drugs much more recently, as recently as the Inaugural."(644) According to Sculimbrene, these drugs included:

designer drugs . . . I think the first time I heard the word `designer drugs' was off an appointee. Cocaine . . . possibly crack cocaine . . . hallucinogenic mushrooms. I think some people used LSD. It was much more than the one or two times when they were 18 or 19 years old . . . this was not just junior staffers, either.(645)

Agent Sculimbrene noted that he did not believe that "a single person" was terminated because of any information of this nature that became apparent from an FBI background investigation.(646)

FBI Agent Cecilia Woods also found recent drug use in the backgrounds of some appointees and noted one instance where drug usage stopped as recently as the day before an individual filled out the SF-86.(647)

It was in a White House having its own problems completing background investigations that Livingstone and Marceca were busy at work on the "Update Project," which resulted in the procurement of hundreds of background investigation files of former Reagan and Bush officials.

D. Secret Service Concerns

1. Delays in submitting background investigations to the Secret Service

The Secret Service also became concerned about the delays in the Clinton White House obtaining permanent passes.(648) Secret Service Agent Arnold Cole was the supervisor of the White House Access Control Branch and was the individual tasked with interfacing with Livingstone's office.(649)

During the transition, Cole and other security personnel met with Clinton officials regarding security matters. At that time, David Watkins was the point of contact and Cole met with him on several occasions.(650) At some point later in February, Livingstone was identified to Cole as the person who would be heading up the office.(651)

During the spring of 1993, Cole convened a meeting of security officers for March 31, 1993 to meet "new members of the administration and discuss any security issues pertaining to the White House complex."(652) These meetings were convened monthly through November 1993.(653) Agent Cole testified that the Secret Service received very few background files before the end of 1993.(654)

As the meetings proceeded through the year, it became apparent that there were problems with staff obtaining permanent passes. Agent Cole testified:

. . . the obvious concern that we had from a security standpoint was that anyone with a temporary pass exceeding 90 days and they have close proximity to the President, we would want to know whether or not this person would pose a possible immediate or projected threat later on. So those were our concerns.(655)

Agent Cole testified that he raised these concerns with Bill Kennedy and explained to him the importance of having the background investigations completed.(656) Yet neither Kennedy's own background file nor Livingstone's were forwarded to the Secret Service until September 20, 1993.(657) Following the submission to the Secret Service of both of their backgrounds, it took another 2 months before the Secret Service issued permanent passes to Kennedy or Livingstone on November 23, 1993.(658) Earlier that month, on November 7, 1993, Livingstone's neighbor filed a complaint with the Montgomery County Police Department, charging Livingstone with a simple assault for threatening her. Mr. Livingstone reportedly said, "If you don't keep that (expletive deleted) dog quiet, I'm going to beat your face in."(659) The neighbor informed police that Livingstone made previous threats to her in the past, which Livingstone admitted.(660)

Background files with no problems take only several days for the Secret Service to issue a permanent pass. No one at the White House was alarmed when the people whom they put in charge of reviewing backgrounds had problems significant enough to cause a 2 month delay in issuing their permanent passes. A man who made assault threats against a woman was put in charge of security at the White House. This should never have occurred.

2. The Secret Service raised concerns about the content of the background files

The Secret Service raised concerns about whether Livingstone should be granted a White House pass,(661) when it obtained his background file in September 1993. Agent Cole said that he became aware of "derogatory information" in Livingstone's file and raised it with Kennedy:

What I recall discussing with Mr. Kennedy was my concerns on the derogatory information and whether or not he concurred or not . . . he wanted to understand specifically what my concern was as it related to our mission . . .(662)

Agent Cole said there was also information in Kennedy's background file which was brought to his attention that he reviewed from a security standpoint and ultimately resolved in favor of Mr. Kennedy.(663)

As background investigations of other individuals started coming into the Secret Service in late 1993 and early 1994, it became apparent that there were issues of recent drug use in many files. Agent Jeff Undercoffer, who reviewed files in early 1994, testified: "I would say more than 30, more than 40, perhaps, had drug usage [beyond college age]" . . . and "a few dozens who were recent."(664) Agent Undercoffer testified to what the files he reviewed included:

I have seen cocaine usage. I have seen hallucinogenic usages, crack usages . . . I would say those are the big three.(665)

In late 1993, the Secret Service raised concerns over an individual's pass request "based on our review of the background investigation" in which they "felt that the derogatory information was such that it may compromise the security of the White House without some other mechanism in place to ensure that our concerns were just merely concerns."(666)

The Secret Service initially denied pass requests for a number of individuals because of very recent drug use.(667) Out of this situation, a program was developed whereby the offending individual was required to participate in a special drug testing program for White House employees with recent drug use.(668)

E. White House Drug Testing Program

In order to obtain the approval of the Secret Service in issuing permanent passes to individuals with recent drug use, the White House instituted a random drug testing program. Agent Cole explained the program: "I think it was a compromise between both the White House and the Secret Service as a suggestion as to what would be amenable to both parties.(669) According to the White House, the program included as many as 21 people over the past several years according to the White House. These were individuals who had drug use in the year before they began work at the White House. Nine such individuals still are employed at the White House.(670) As White House Counsel Jack Quinn explained the program:

In a small number of instances, the Office of White House Counsel in consultation with the Secret Service, determined that an

individual should be issued a pass only if he or she agrees to be subject to the more frequent, non-random special drug testing protocol described above. This means being tested unannounced twice a year under the same conditions as the standard random testing program in the EOP's Drug-Free Workplace Plan. These individuals are so designated because information developed in the course of the security clearance process or supplied by the individual suggested that it would be prudent to do so.(671)

It is important to recognize that this program is handled entirely by the White House Counsel's Office and the drug testing is administered by the EOP random testing program. When an individual is placed in this program, a "drug letter" is placed in his or her file with the Secret Service. The Secret Service is then informed if there is any positive drug testing.

The individual must sign this "drug letter" indicating that they acknowledge the drug use set forth in his or her FBI background investigation and the individual is informed that any positive drug test would be grounds for immediate termination.(672)

The Secret Service has no role in the procedures for the drug testing program and relies entirely upon the information provided by the White House. There is no independent verification of the information by the Secret Service, which is entirely dependent upon the good faith efforts of the Counsel's Office to comply with the requirements in the "drug letter." The White House Counsel's Office staff who have been involved since 1993 in overseeing or supervising the special drug testing are Bill Kennedy, Beth Nolan and Chris Cerf.(673)

While the White House went to extraordinary lengths to have recent drug users on staff_it even created a special program to keep them employed at the White House_a June 10, 1993 memo suggests that Bill Kennedy and Craig Livingstone seemed to think drug users might have some kind of "right" to a job at the White House! (674)

In regard to staff who admit present or prior drug use, the June 10, 1993 memo asks: "Does the President have the authority to (1) refuse employment; (2) hire on conditions: send the individual to a health care professional to assess the individual's suitability/risk as a pre-condition of employment; and, (3) hire without any conditions?"(675) Mr. Kennedy, who oversaw the frivolous firings of the Travel Office, had to ask whether or not the President could deny present drug users a job at the White House.

F. CIA Compartmented Clearances

The Clinton White House issued the highest of national security clearances, CIA compartmented clearances, to Livingstone, Wetzl and other young staffers in the Office of Personnel Security. Although CIA officials reviewed Livingstone's drug history and FBI background file, it does not appear that the CIA made any objections to issuing Livingstone at least three separate compartmented clearances.(676) Records the committee has now reviewed make it clear that the Clinton White House gave Craig Livingstone access to the most classified sensitive information.

The committee was troubled by the ease with which unsuitable candidates were given the highest levels of security clearances. The CIA explained to the committee that it authorized the clearances, including that of Livingstone, because the White House made the requests.

Finally, even when the White House decided to upgrade the security clearance process, Livingstone was given special treatment again. Current White House Security Chief Charles Easley testified that he did not review Livingstone's file when he was updating the clearances of everyone at the White House.(677) Mr. Easley testified that even though he reviewed the file of everyone else he worked with at the White House, he declined to review Livingstone's file and approved him for a security clearance in December 1995.(678) This is the individual the White House put in charge of the security office when Craig Livingstone resigned.

The lax and cavalier attitude the Clinton White House has regarding security was evident from the day Kennedy and Livingstone were placed in positions of responsibility at the White House. Mrs. Clinton had a role in Kennedy's hiring. Mr. Kennedy took full advantage of his connections to the President and Mrs. Clinton, informing FBI liaison Bourke of the relationship. Both Kennedy and Livingstone were unsuited to this sensitive work given problems with their own backgrounds and evidence of questionable conduct.

Despite complaints from the FBI and Secret Service about inordinate delays and abuse of past processes, the White House continued to allow unsuitable individuals to preside over the office. The White House ignored FBI and Secret Service concerns, and the office was eventually found to have inappropriately gathered FBI background files on hundreds of former Reagan and Bush officials.

The White House is at the center of policies and debates that may determine matters of life or death, war or peace. For the past 30 years, the White House has engaged in a careful process of security clearances and background checks on individuals to determine their suitability for positions in the White House and throughout the executive branch.

The clearance and background process is designed to protect the security of the President as well as the national security of the country. One need only recall the case of Aldrich Ames to realize what kind of problems can spring from a lack of vigilance in security matters. As important as it is to have solid procedures in place to guard against breaches of security, the people who operate such procedures must be carefully selected and remain above reproach. Clearly, that did not happen in the Clinton White House where cronies and political operatives were put in charge of these sensitive matters.

Whether or not these events are shown to be a blunder, the result of colossal incompetence, or whether they are established to be more serious or even criminal, the casualness with which this White House has approached many areas of security and access provided a climate for either of these troubling alternatives. The modus operandi of this White House allowed persons of questionable backgrounds to remain in the White House.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, HON. CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, HON. JOHN L. MICA, AND HON. DICK CHRYSLER

Nothing in the hearing record or the entire course of our inquiry into this matter has established any improper contacts, dealings, or relationship whatsoever, between FBI Director Louis Freeh and former White House Security Director Craig Livingstone.

Neither, is there any evidence of anything in the record of our inquiry (particularly as relates to the subject matter of the inappropriate disclosure by FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro to the White House), which indicates any intent whatsoever by Director Freeh to protect the President or Mrs. Clinton in this matter.

FBI General Counsel Shapiro's lack of judgement in an ill advised disclosure to the White House, should not be viewed as reflecting adversely on the professionalism or independence of Director Louis Freeh, nor the many dedicated men and women of the FBI, who proudly serve our Nation so well, each and every day.

In addition, we recommend that in the future, all supervisory, operational, and line positions, including that of general counsel at the FBI, shall be filled solely by FBI agent personnel.

Hon. William F. Clinger, Jr.

Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman.

Hon. Constance A. Morella.

Hon. John L. Mica.

Hon. Dick Chrysler.

MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. CARDISS COLLINS, HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., HON. LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. GARY A. CONDIT, HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, HON. KAREN L. THURMAN, HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT, HON. BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, HON. GENE GREEN, HON. CARRIE P. MEEK, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. BILL K. BREWSTER, HON. TIM HOLDEN, AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS

We agree that the requests by White House staff for files on former employees were wrong, and we have supported the committee's efforts to investigate the reasons for and circumstances surrounding the obtaining of these records from the FBI. The issue for this committee is whether the files were requested for political purposes with the intent of getting damaging information on these former employees, or instead were requested as the result of errors.

After taking sworn depositions from dozens of present and former White House employees, the committee has uncovered no evidence that the individual who requested the files had been ordered to purposely obtain them by higher-ups in the Clinton administration. Nor has it uncovered any evidence that anyone higher than Craig Livingstone was aware that the files had been improperly requested. Even more importantly, the committee has no evidence that the files were improperly disclosed to anyone outside the White House Personnel Security Office.

If the majority had issued an honest report by pointing out the deficiencies of the Office of Personnel Security while acknowledging the lack of evidence that it was anything more than a bureaucratic mistake, we would have supported it. But when the majority makes such reckless findings as that this somehow "leads to the possibility that the Clinton Administration was attempting to prepare a political `hit list'," without even a shred of evidence or testimony supporting that charge, we can only conclude that honesty is not in the majority's vocabulary. This report is yet another blow to this committee's long tradition of oversight which is honest, fair, non-partisan, and credible.

In addition, the majority's claim that the FBI files would not have been revealed without the committee's threat of contempt is disingenuous and inaccurate. The White House never exerted a claim of privilege over the Dale FBI file, and the majority report's allegation of White House stonewalling is no more credible here than it was in the Travel Office report.

Further, the majority's shameless attack on FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro, a career, non-partisan law enforcement professional with unimpeachable credentials, for actions which were clearly appropriate, is outrageous and an embarrassment to the committee. If the majority believes that Mr. Shapiro should resign for disclosing what it claims was "confidential law enforcement information," then Chairman Clinger should also resign for disclosing that very information in a public statement on the House Floor. It is transparently obvious that the majority is angry at Mr. Shapiro only because his efforts to act in a fair and non-partisan manner thwarted its attempt to score points in the press.

For these reasons, we strongly dissent.

We in the minority have addressed the problems identified in the FBI's report, "The Dissemination of FBI File Information to the White House" in order to guarantee that this sort of potential invasion of privacy could not happen again. We support the bill introduced by Ranking Minority Member Cardiss Collins, H.R. 3785, the Background Security Records Act of 1996, to ensure that FBI records containing sensitive background security information provided to the White House are properly protected for privacy and security.

The bill would amend both the Privacy Act and the Presidential Records Act to enact procedural safeguards so that individuals could be certain their confidential background files would not be disseminated without their permission. If the majority were truly interested in conducting responsible oversight and addressing these types of problems, they would support these types of meaningful legislative reforms. Instead, they are intent on turning this serious issue into partisan politics. The Republicans have also refused to hold even a single hearing on the bill.

What the committee hearings revealed

The committee's hearings revealed a number of relevant facts about the FBI files. We learned that it was standard practice for each administration to engage in what is now known as the Update Project_that is, the recreation of personnel security files for holdover employees from the previous administration. This was required, because each administration removes all of its files when it leaves office. The procedure for requesting files was to use a preprinted Xeroxed form with the name of the White House Counsel typed at the top, but requiring no signature. These forms date back 30 years to the Johnson administration. This procedure was, as the FBI found, ripe for abuse, and it now appears that these forms were inadvertently used to obtain the FBI files on former employees. The White House has taken unprecedented steps to change these procedures and bring accountability to the process, but the files were already requested.

Witnesses interviewed by the committee could only speculate on the reasons for what happened. A common theme expressed by Bush administration White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray and Nancy Gemmell, a longtime-aide in the Personnel Security Office, was that the use of detailees and interns with insufficient background in security or name recognition was a key problem.(679) We agree. Security work is extremely sensitive, but there appears to have been an extremely lax attitude in the treatment of FBI files.

One important witness was Lisa Wetzl, who was the first to discover that Anthony Marceca had requested "too many files", meaning those no longer employed by the White House. Ms. Wetzl notified her supervisor, Craig Livingstone, of that fact, and proceeded to determine which of the files involved employees no longer working in the White House. Although the files should have been returned to the FBI, they were boxed and apparently indexed and placed in the White House archives, where there is no evidence they were seen again, with the apparent exception of files for active employees mistakenly placed there.

Ms. Wetzl's testimony is extremely relevant, because she has stated that when she worked on the Update Project after Mr. Marceca, she requested a Secret Service list of employees holding active passes. In her view, the list was out-of-date, and required cross-checking with offices. She also recalls seeing an out-of-date Secret Service list, which she believes was requested by Ms. Gemmell, and used by Ms. Gemmell to prepare requests to the FBI, and that the list may have had the names of Marlin Fitzwater and James Baker.

On June 20, 1996, Secret Service witnesses testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that they did not believe the list was generated by them, but the actual evidence suggests a less clear picture. For example, during the committee's depositions of Secret Service witnesses, it was noted that in one case, the White House requested the previous report on a person named Agin_"A" "G" "I" "N". It now appears that there was no such person. The correct individual was named Hagin_"H" "A" "G" "I" "N". It just so happens that a Secret Service list from 1993 also listed the individual as Agin, with a space rather than an "H" at the beginning of the name.

The significance of this fact is that it suggests that the White House Office of Personnel Security was in fact working off of some Secret Service list, and not a list it generated. This was further confirmed by Ms. Wetzl, who recalled both Ms. Gemmell and Mr. Marceca working off a list with the distinctive green and white computer paper used by the Secret Service.

The Senate hearing also showed other problems with the Secret Service lists. For example, in what was described as a "computer glitch", names that were being deactivated from one Secret Service passholder list were not automatically being deactivated from another list. The committee also received a list from the White House dated March 31, 1993, which may have been generated by the Secret Service. That list is entitled "E-Pass Possible Admin Holdover Passholders by Name", and includes among other names, George Bush, James Baker, and Marlin Fitzwater.

In addition, the committee received a list generated in February 1994 as part of an effort to develop a list of White House staff for such things as invitations to the White House Easter Egg Roll. That list has names such as Spencer Abraham and James Baker as working in the White House. The source of the names is listed as the Secret Service. A follow-up agenda from a July 7, 1994, meeting between White House personnel and Secret Service shows a complaint that former employees, such as James Baker, continued to show up on Secret Service lists.

The other interesting fact about the FBI files requests is that the requests were made for all other offices, such as GSA, before any requests were made for White House staff. If there were an underhanded effort to get the files on former White House employees, presumably those files would have been requested first and not last.

Chairman Clinger's disclosures

Ironically, the only public disclosure of an FBI background file to date has been Chairman Clinger's disclosure on the House Floor of the contents of the FBI file on Craig Livingstone, which he was permitted to review by the FBI. Contained within this file was the summary report by Special Agent Dennis Sculimbrene that White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum told him that Craig Livingstone had the backing of the First Lady, who was a friend of Livingstone's mother.

This tidbit was the first item of news from our investigations and hearings on the FBI files that the chairman deemed important enough to take to the House Floor. The chairman's special order insinuated that Bernard Nussbaum, Craig Livingstone, William Kennedy and the First Lady must have lied, because they had denied this allegation.

Perhaps the chairman was just raising an issue for investigation; but that could have been done in a letter to the Independent Counsel. We can only conclude that the clear purpose of the Floor statement was to plant in the minds of the American people the unsubstantiated thought that the First Family and all of their lawyers were lying about this matter. Indeed, who after watching this special order wouldn't think they were lying and raise the question of why an FBI agent would write this note if it weren't true?

Yet, just like every other time that there has been a wild, unsubstantiated accusation hurled at the occupants of the White House, only half the facts were released. In this case, neither House Members on the Floor nor the public who was watching were given information on the credibility of the agent who had written the note.

The allegation that Mrs. Clinton was behind the hiring of Craig Livingstone and knew his mother was hardly news. Agent Gary Aldrich, a friend and colleague of Mr. Sculimbrene, had made the charge in the Wall Street Journal and in his widely discredited book, Unlimited Access. The allegation had also appeared in the Wall Street Journal on June 25, but in this case, Mr. Sculimbrene was reported to have attributed the remark not to Mr. Nussbaum, but to William Kennedy and Craig Livingstone.

Then on July 15, in what the chairman described in his letter to Ranking Minority Member Collins not as a deposition under Rule 19 of the committee rules, which requires 3 days written notice, but something called a "sworn interview," Mr. Sculimbrene told the majority staff that it was Mr. Livingstone who actually told him this fact. He also said he did not put the statement in Mr. Livingstone's background file.

Mr. Sculimbrene in fact has told numerous stories about how he came to know this so-called fact. We might have never known about the discrepancies in Mr. Sculimbrene's statements to the majority staff in his interview, if the minority had not insisted on getting the transcript, which the majority had initially refused to provide. In assessing Agent Sculimbrene's credibility, we must also look at an FBI memo in the committee's possession, in which Special Agent David Bowie stated that Mr. Sculimbrene's behavior was "abnormal and indeed irrational" in a conversation with him. Agent Sculimbrene, who is described in the memo as a close personal friend of fired Travel Office head Billy Dale, is recalled as "voicing very bitter political feelings against the Clinton White House." Agent Bowie expressed his concern that Sculimbrene, who appeared as a defense witness at the Dale trial, might "provide erroneous testimony."

We cannot help but wonder why, if this allegation was truly troublesome, the committee's investigators did not go to Craig Livingstone's mother, Gloria, to ask her directly whether she knew the First Lady. She has subsequently denied that she does. Perhaps a cursory review of her background could have revealed if there were any truth to the allegation. We suspect the reason was obvious_they knew she would deny it, and they knew that the more they investigated this matter, the more implausible the allegation would become.

We must also address the issues of whether the FBI should have told the White House about the existence of this summary in the file, the majority's finding that FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro provided confidential FBI law enforcement information to the White House, and the majority's shameless demand that he resign.

First, it is obvious that the reason the majority was upset about the notification is simply that the White House had an opportunity to present its side of the story at the same time the chairman went to the Floor, as opposed to a day later. There is little doubt that the other side of the story would not have been released by the chairman and become available to the White House.

Second, the notion that the information was confidential law enforcement information which should not have been shared with the White House is absurd. The information, as is standard practice, was gathered at the specific request of the White House in order to determine whether Mr. Livingstone was suitable for employment. It was not part of some sort of criminal investigation. A summary of that information, including any derogatory information, had already been provided to the White House. The information which Mr. Shapiro communicated to the White House was not derogatory, nor was it confidential as far as the White House was concerned.

Third, the statement that Mr. Shapiro notified the White House about the information before the committee was allowed to review it is simply not true. As Mr. Shapiro testified at the August 1, 1996, hearing, he had offered to make it available to the majority, but they had rescheduled:

My intent was to notify roughly simultaneously both the committee and the White House, for whom this information had originally been gathered. Knowing that committee majority staff was due to examine the materials that same afternoon, I placed a call to the Justice Department, where I advised the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General of the information and of my intent to advise the White House Counsel's office. I then called the Counsel's office, and spoke with Deputy Counsel to the President, Kathleen Wallman. Because of a last minute rescheduling by the committee staff of which I had been unaware, the majority staff did not in fact see the information until the following day.

In no way did Mr. Shapiro withhold the information, as claimed by the majority.

Fourth, before the FBI took any action with this information, it asked the one law enforcement entity which might have an interest, the Independent Counsel. As Mr. Shapiro testified, the Independent Counsel had no problems with Congress reviewing the files, nor did they ask that any conditions be placed upon its release, which could have included release to the White House. They did not even want to review the file. To the extent Mr. Nussbaum would have been testifying to a Grand Jury, the issue would not have been who hired Craig Livingstone.

Finally, Chairman Clinger's Floor statement criticized two FBI agents for going to Agent Sculimbrene's home and telling him that the White House was unhappy with what he had written about Mr. Nussbaum's interview. Once again, the question is what type of investigation did the committee do to determine the veracity of this charge against the two agents before making these public charges. Mr. Shapiro testified that the agents in question denied the allegation:

At no time did the agents tell agent Sculimbrene that the White House was unhappy and concerned about this particular interview. No such thing occurred.

Therefore, it appears that this may be one more case in which Agent Sculimbrene's account of a conversation is disputed.

The concern of the FBI that in light of the denials, Agent Sculimbrene's report may have been inaccurate, was a real one. Just recently, FBI Agent Halbert Harlow was convicted of falsifying over 50 White House interviews.

When this committee began its hearings into the FBI files, we in the minority fully concurred. We too wanted to get to the bottom of how and why the files were requested, and what was done with them. However, as the committee's investigation increasingly demonstrated that the requests were in fact a bureaucratic error and not a sinister plot, the committee hearings kept shifting their focus.

Revealing Confidential FBI Information

The majority has repeatedly disclosed sensitive, internal FBI files, despite the majority's criticism of the White House for its handling of FBI records. As previously discussed, when Chairman Clinger went to the House Floor on July 25, 1996, he divulged certain contents in the FBI file of Craig Livingstone. The divulging of confidential derogatory information found in that file is exactly the concern that the committee had expressed concerning the White House request of FBI files of former administration employees. Ironically, the committee has uncovered no evidence that the White House ever disseminated the information contained in those FBI files. On the other hand, the chairman did.

The disclosure stands in stark contrast to his comments to Ranking Minority Member Collins in a letter dated July 15, 1996, in which he wrote: "I have been extremely reluctant to directly review FBI files. It is the abuse of such files by the Clinton White House which initiated this congressional investigation." He then stated that he "would determine what, if any, information may be shared with the Members of this Committee." Instead of consulting with any member of the committee, the speech was made on the House Floor before the C-Span public.

Even before the chairman went to the House Floor, the contents of Mr. Livingstone's files were in the press. An AP story of 4:39 p.m. on July 25, 1996, describes an FBI agent's notes alleging that he was told by Bernard Nussbaum that Mr. Livingstone had been recommended by the First Lady and that Mrs. Clinton knew his mother. Before rushing to the Floor to raise questions about the integrity of the First Lady, Mr. Nussbaum, and Mr. Livingstone, the committee might have done at least a minimal amount of investigation.

Minimum fairness to the individuals would have required full disclosure of the trustworthiness of Special Agent Sculimbrene. Among the documents requested by subpoena was a memo by SSA David Bowie, dated August 7, 1995, who recounted a discussion he had with Agent Sculimbrene concerning the prosecution of Billy Dale (Document FBI-00005437-00005442):

It became immediately apparent that SA SCULIMBRENE held extremely intense feelings about the indictment of subject BILLY DALE whom he described as a personal and professional friend. It became equally apparent that SA SCULIMBRENE blames the CLINTON WHITE HOUSE and the FBI for the predicament in which subject DALE finds himself. During the course of a sometimes heated conversation between the writer and SA SCULIMBRENE, it became equally apparent that SA SCULIMBRENE has allowed both his personal and political feelings to obscure his judgement relative to this entire matter.

* * * * *

Specifically, SA SCULIMBRENE erroneously stated that he had provided a memo to the writer in the White House Travel Office matter allegedly containing the information relevant to the inquiry. . . . The writer never received a memo from SA SCULIMBRENE dealing with the above subject matter.

* * * * *

In fact, the information provided by SA SCULIMBRENE during conversations with the writer merely implies that he has very strong political views involving the CLINTON Administration and a close personal relationship with the subject of this matter, BILLY R. DALE. . . .

The writer is very concerned about the overall temperament and demeanor of SCULIMBRENE reflected on 8/4/95. While the writer is not in a position to render Psychological judgements/conclusions about others, it is the opinion of this writer that SA SCULIMBRENE's conduct/behavior, on 8/4/95, is clearly outside the norm. The writer notes that SA SCULIMBRENE was involved, approximately a year ago, in a serious accident which almost cost him his life. It is noteworthy to point out that during the course of the 8/4/95, discussions with the writer, SCULIMBRENE commented, while pointing towards his head, that he could get away with anything because "I am handicapped".

* * * * *

SSA BOWIE is very concerned that SA SCULIMBRENE has allowed his personal and political feelings toward the CLINTON White House to destroy his objectivity in dealing with this issue. It is equally perplexing to understand why any FBI Agent would allow his personal relationships with a subject of a criminal probe to become this involved as such behavior constitutes, as a minimum, the appearance of a conflict of interest. The writer is persuaded that SA SCULIMBRENE is contemplating either testimony before a Congressional Committee and/or plans to serve as a defense witness for subject BILLY DALE. Should he decide to do this, his credibility as a witness and as a FBI Agent will be destroyed in the aftermath. The situation detailed above is potentially embarrassing for the FBI and is potentially a disaster for SA SCULIMBRENE.

* * * * *

It is highly suggested that WMFO management look at the possibility that SA SCULIMBRENE may be in need of EAP and/or some form of emotional support. The writer is persuaded that SCULIMBRENE's behavior is abnormal and indeed irrational. In addition, SA SCULIMBRENE should be made aware of the consequences should he decide to provide erroneous testimony in an effort to help his friend, and C-7 subject, BILLY R. DALE.

Instead of alerting House Members and the public that the FBI agent whose notes conflict with the testimony of Mr. Nussbaum and Mr. Livingstone was a close personal friend of Billy R. Dale, and whose credibility was challenged by another FBI agent, Chairman Clinger was silent, leading an average listener to assume that Mr. Sculimbrene was an ordinary FBI agent. Chairman Clinger might have disclosed that Mr. Sculimbrene was an associate of Mr. Gary Aldrich, whose credibility on White House matters has been, to put it mildly, called into question.(680) He also never stated that Agent Sculimbrene was quoted in the Wall Street Journal as stating that he knew of the purported relationship between Mr. Livingstone's mother and the First Lady from Mr. Livingstone and Mr. Kennedy (June 25, 1996), and that he had told Senate investigators that Mr. Kennedy was the source of his information.

The majority does not merely raise questions when making charges such as those made in Chairman Clinger's special order. If the sole intent was to bring this to the attention of the Independent Counsel, a private letter to Mr. Starr would have sufficed.

But this was not the only example of the majority's rushing to a partisan judgment without conducting even a minimal amount of investigation. On June 5, 1996, Chairman Clinger held a press conference detailing a request for Billy Ray Dale's FBI background file that bore Mr. Nussbaum's typed name. The chairman alleged that "At the very least, there is a strong implication President Clinton's counsel acted unethically in requesting confidential background checks of a former employee." According to an article distributed by the Associated Press, "U.S. Rep. William Clinger, R-Pa., suggested the written request might be a false statement that could be prosecuted as a felony." Subsequent investigation quickly established that Mr. Nussbaum, like his predecessors, never reviewed such requests.

As Mr. Nussbaum testified at the committee's June 26, 1996, hearing:

So, on the basis of a printed form, Mr. Chairman, you told the country, Mr. Chairman, that, at best, I was unethical as White House Counsel; at worst, I was a felon. . . . But you had no member of your staff call me, to ask me a simple question_did I ever request Billy Dale's FBI files six months after he was fired? Was I really trying to dig up dirt on Billy Dale when he was being investigated by the Justice Department? Those notions are absurd on their face. They are false. But no one called to ask. (Emphasis added).

Mr. Nussbaum then testified under oath that he had no knowledge that Mr. Dale's or any other former White House employee's FBI files had been requested, and that he certainly did not order copies of FBI files.

The chairman responded by saying that the "documents speak for themselves," and dismissed Mr. Nussbaum's demand for an apology by suggesting that he was attempting to "demonize" him. We believe this is a wholly inadequate response. The chairman very publicly_and wrongly_accused Mr. Nussbaum of possible criminal behavior, without conducting even a minimal amount of investigation. Whether those accusations were innocent or intentional, the record clearly demonstrates that they were false.

When we in the minority requested, in a letter dated June 28, 1996, that the chairman take the fair and decent course by admitting that he overreached and apologizing to Mr. Nussbaum, he once again refused. Instead, he replied:

. . . (A)s you will see, I never made reference to Mr. Nussbaum as a "felon," as he has alleged. In fact when I was specifically asked, "How much trouble is Mr. Nussbaum in?" I stated, "Well, I think it's premature to say whether, you know, whether he's in any trouble."

However, the transcript of that press conference, provided by the chairman himself in his reply, confirms that the chairman did make those statements about Mr. Nussbaum to the press:

At the very least, there is a strong implication President Clinton's counsel acted unethically in requesting confidential background checks of a former employee. At the very worst, the request may have violated the Privacy Act . . .

The chairman has yet to admit his error or to apologize to Mr. Nussbaum. Nor has he apologized to Presidential Advisor George Stephanopoulos for partisan leaks suggesting that Mr. Stephanopoulos was somehow responsible for Mr. Livingstone's position as Director of the Personnel Security Office without releasing other information in the committee's possession demonstrating that that was not the case.

Who Hired Craig Livingstone?

The majority is obsessed with determining who hired Craig Livingstone, as if that startling mystery was the key to unraveling their entire conspiracy theory. However, the records provided to the committee, if the majority would take the time to read them, reveal exactly how Mr. Livingstone was hired. The answer is much less exciting than the majority would have us believe.

The resume of David Craig Livingstone lists his current job as "Presidential Inaugural Committee, Director of Security" from November 1992 to present. Prior to that he lists his occupation as "President-Elect Clinton and Vice-President-Elect Gore, Lead and Site Lead Advance" in November 1992. Prior to that his job is listed as "Senior Consultant to Counter-Event Operations, Clinton/Gore '92" from October, 1991 to November 1992.

At the top of the resume is a handwritten notation stating "Sponsored by Eli Segal." Mr. Segal, who was a campaign manager in the Clinton Campaign is also the first reference in Mr. Livingstone's resume, and is listed as "Chief Financial Officer, Clinton-Gore Presidential Transition Team."

On February 8, 1993, Mr. Livingstone signs a "Declaration of Appointee", which is a form used in determining fitness for employment.

The job of Director of the Office of Personnel Security is supervised by the Office of White House Counsel. In a memorandum from David Watkins, Assistant to the President for Management, to Bernard Nussbaum, Assistant to the President and Counsel, and Vincent Foster, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Counsel, dated February 16, 1993, Watkins lays out the budget and full-time employees, which are to be proposed for the Counsel's Office budget.

It appears from the memo that Watkins had authorized 28 slots at $1,100,000. The Counsel's Office had responded with a budget of 25 slots at $1,100,000 along with a proposal to shift the three employees of the Security Office, other than its head, to the Personnel account. Watkins responds that if the slots are shifted, the Office of White House Counsel must reduce its budget by $85,000.

On February 17, 1993, Craig Livingstone sends a memo to William Kennedy, Associate Counsel to the President, describing the functions of the Security Office.

On February 18, 1993, Kennedy sends a memo to Vincent Foster attaching Livingstone's memo. He writes, "The result of all of these functions is that the Office moves much paper. I need to discuss this subject with you when you have time."

On February 23, 1993 Kennedy sends a memo to Nussbaum describing the major functions of the White House Security Office, apparently based upon Livingstone's memo.

On February 24, 1993, Nussbaum and Foster (now also joined by William Kennedy, Associate Counsel to the President) respond to the Watkins memo taking issue with their allocation. They note that they propose to spend just $91,000 on the three assistants (compared with $121,000 under the Bush administration) and just $45,000 on the head of the office (compared with $67,000 for the incumbent), apparently implying that they should not have their budget reduced by $85,000 in light of their savings.

On March 1, 1993, David Watkins sent a memo to Bernard Nussbaum stating, "I understand from your budget that you believe the position currently held by Jane Dannenhauer, Assistant to the Counsel to the President for Security, should be part of your budget and should be compensated at a rate of $42,000 per year. Please let me know when you have identified the new staffer to fill Ms. Dannenhauer's position. At the moment, her salary of $70,255 is counting against your budget. But this amount will be reduced when you replace Ms. Dannenhauer." Watkins also consents to giving the Counsel the full $1,100,000 for 25 slots.

On March 9, 1993, in a memo to David Watkins from Bernard Nussbaum and Vincent Foster, they state that "Craig Livingstone was hired in February as Assistant Counsel to the President for Security with a salary of $45,000, not $42,000 as originally budgeted."

On March 10, 1993, William Kennedy sends a memo to David Watkins. It states "This is a request that the start date of the employment of two individuals employed in the White House Security Office be established as of the following dates: David Craig Livingstone; Title: Assistant to the Counsel to the President (Security); Effective Employment Date: 2/8/93; Annual Salary $45,000." The other individual is Mari Anderson, who is listed as Security Assistant with an effective employment Date of 2/15/93. The memo states, "Mr. Livingstone and Ms. Anderson have been on the job and working since the start dates indicated above while the budget parameters were being resolved."

A document entitled, "The White House Office, Request for Personnel Action" dated 3/11/93, bears the initials "DW/CL" (presumably David Watkins; the CL may also be CC). It requests Livingstone be put on the payroll retroactively to 2/8/93.

A document entitled, "Notification of Personnel Action" with an approval date of March 11, 1993, shows that Mr. Livingstone has been placed on the payroll retroactively to February 8, 1993, as Assistant to the Counsel to the President (Security). The document bears the typed name of Mary Coutts Beck, Acting Director of PMO, along with some form of an initial.

It would appear that Mr. Livingstone's recollection of the events leading up to his hiring, described when he appeared as a witness, are generally accurate. He apparently moved into the White House by way of the campaign and the Inauguration, where he served as Director of Security for the Inaugural Committee. His resume shows he was sponsored by Eli Segal, a campaign official and involved in the transition.

Mr. Livingstone apparently came to the White House on February 8, 1993 on an unpaid basis, and appears to have spent his first week reviewing the operations of the Security Office. The work would appear to have been done on behalf of William Kennedy, since the memo of February 17, 1993 was sent from Livingstone to Kennedy.

It appears that during the week from February 16, 1993 to February 24, 1993, the Counsel's Office was primarily interested in achieving a larger budget by moving the personnel from the Security Office (except for its head) onto the payroll of the Personnel Office.

Eventually, in memos to David Watkins dated March 9, 1993, and March 10, 1993, Nussbaum, Foster, and Kennedy all take responsibility for the hiring of Livingstone. Watkins on the subsequent day takes the final action resulting in Livingstone's hiring retroactive to the date of his declaration on February 8, 1993.

Hon. Cardiss Collins.

Hon. Henry A. Waxman.

Hon. Tom Lantos.

Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr.

Hon. Major R. Owens.

Hon. Edolphus Towns.

Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr.

Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter.

Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.

Hon. Gary A. Condit.

Hon. Collin C. Peterson.

Hon. Karen L. Thurman.

Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney.

Hon. Thomas M. Barrett.

Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins.

Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton.

Hon. James P. Moran.

Hon. Gene Green.

Hon. Carrie P. Meek.

Hon. Chaka Fattah.

Hon. Bill K. Brewster.

Hon. Tim Holden.

Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.

@

(1)

Report of Fiscal Year 1994; Federal Bureau of Investigations; Louis Freeh, Director.

(2) Letter from Jack Quinn to Chairman William F. Clinger, Jr., Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives, May 30, 1996.

(3) White House document CGE 43641.

(4) According to Anthony Marceca's documents produced under subpoena to the committee, (unnumbered) the "(S)" notation referred to the type of access being sought for the individual. An "S" meant that the White House was seeking access for Mr. Dale as White House Staff rather than for an "I" for intern or volunteer position.

(5) White House document CGE 43642.

(6) Committee deposition of James Bourke, June 17, 1996, pp. 62-63.

(7) Id., pp. 65-66.

(8) Statement by Jane Sherburne, June 5, 1996.

(9) Sherburne deposition, p. 73.

(10) The GAO spokesperson stated that it "never asked presidential aides for the FBI background file of fired Travel Office director Billy Dale" and generally disclaimed that the GAO ever asked for or was allowed to review any FBI background files. Pete Yost, White House Struggles to Explain Why it Obtained Dale's FBI File, Associated Press, June 6, 1996.

(11) Jane Sherburne later testified that the White House learned of this information on June 6, 1996, through Mr. Livingstone's lawyers, Randy Turk and David Cohen of the Washington law firm of Miller Cassidy, LaRocca & Lewin. Sherburne deposition, July 23, 1996, pp. 74-75.

(12) Sherburne deposition, p. 85.

(13) Pete Yost, Dale FBI File Part of Larger Effort to Recreate White House Files, Associated Press, June 7, 1996.

(14) Id.

(15) Neil E. Lewis, White House Says Requests for FBI Files Was Wider, New York Times, June 8, 1996.

(16) Pete Yost, Baker, Fitzwater, Brady Among 330 FBI Files White House Got, Associated Press, June 7, 1996.

(17) See June 10, 1996 Special Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne, letter to Chairman Clinger, p. 1.

(18) Neil E. Lewis, White House Says Request for F.B.I. Files Was Wider, New York Times, June 8, 1996.

(19) John F. Harris, White House Admits Having Background Files, Washington Post, June 8, 1996.

(20) Mr. Marceca stated in his sworn deposition that he met Craig Livingstone earlier that day at a local flea market and they went to Craig Livingstone's house nearby. After Mr. Livingstone telephoned his lawyer, they both went to his lawyer's offices where Mr. Marceca was questioned and delivered a sworn statement. Marceca deposition, p. 114.

We do not know why Mr. Marceca's attorney was not present or when his attorney received the copy of the sworn statement that was handed to the White House the following day.

(21) Marceca deposition, p. 152.

(22) Security of the FBI Files: Hearing before House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 19, 1996.

(23) Id.

(24) Meg Greenfield, The White House Wants, Washington Post, June 24, 1996.

(25) Letter from Chairman DeConcini to President Clinton, August 11, 1994.

(26) Hearing testimony also illuminated other complaints against Livingstone during his tenure at the White House. Specifically, Livingstone was reprimanded by Evelyn Lieberman, Assistant to the Chief of Staff for the First Lady, for discussing the details of a background investigation with a young female staffer. It is not clear why the First Lady's staff was in the chain of command to reprimand Craig Livingstone, who reported to the Counsel's Office. Livingstone also had a police report filed against him in November 1993, when he threatened a female neighbor because her dog was barking. Livingstone reportedly said he would "beat her face in" if she did not quiet her dog. Livingstone admitted to the police officer that he did make the threat. Security of the FBI Files: Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 26, 1996.

(27) See letter from Livingstone to then-Counsel to the President Abner Mikva, "It would be wrong not to approve my request . . . I apologize for my tone, but this is my last try to remain part of the team." August 28, 1995, White House document, CGE 48058.

(28) White House documents, CGE 47858-47860. Times of Livingstone's entry and exit White House complex.

(29) Committee deposition of Bernard Nussbaum, July 11, 1996, p. 21.

(30) Resume of David Craig Livingstone, White House document DGE 46320-46234.

(31) Montgomery County, MD Department of Police, Event Report, Report of Simple Assault, November 7, 1993.

(32) Security of the FBI Files: Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 26, 1996.

(33) Memorandum from Marceca to Livingstone, undated, Marceca document Bates Stamp No. 117.

(34) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 41.

(35) Letter from Livingstone to Secretary Perry, March 17, 1994, White House document CGE 55749.

(36) White House document DBI 54256.

(37) See June 20, 1996 letter from Jack Quinn to Chairman Clinger, p. 2.

(38) Security of FBI Background Files hearings, June 26, 1996.

(39) Cole deposition, p. 37.

(40) Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(1) of the initiation of a preliminary investigation and application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 593 (c)(1) for the expansion of the jurisdiction of an Independent Counsel.

(41) Memorandum to John Collingwood, Inspector in Charge, Office of Public and Congressional Affairs, FBI, from Carl Stern, Director of Public Affairs; subject: contact with the White House and other executive branch agencies; June 13, 1993.

(42) June 5, 1996 Justice Department FBI immediate release.

(43) Wesley Pruden, The Limited Hangout at the White House, Washington Times, June 7, 1996, p. A4.

(44) Report of the FBI general counsel on the dissemination of FBI file information to the White House, June 14, 1996.

(45) Id.

(46) FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro stated that he did meet with Independent Counsel Starr's office during this short period where he had authority to investigate this matter. Although Mr. Shapiro did not provide the details of this briefing, the Independent Counsel provided highly confidential background information to Mr. Shapiro on the status of its investigation at that time. It is unclear whether Mr. Shapiro in turn relayed this information to the White House as an "interested party" or to the Justice Department.

(47) Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(1) of the initiation of a preliminary investigation and application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 593 (c)(1) for the expansion of the jurisdiction of an Independent Counsel.

(48) Security of FBI Files hearings, June 26, 1996, p. 57.

(49) Letter from FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro to Chairman Clinger, July 19, 1996.

(50) Security of FBI Files hearing, August 1, 1996, p. 33.

(51) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to President George Bush, p. 2, in committee files.

(52) Id.

(53) Id.

(54) Id.

(55) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 38.

(56) Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 38.

(57) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to President George Bush, pp. 11-12.

(58) Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 23-26.

(59) Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 26.

(60) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 3.

(61) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 20.

(62) Report of the FBI general counsel on the dissemination of FBI file information to the White House, June 14, 1996, p. 19.

(63) Id., p. 20.

(64) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 3.

(65) Id.

(66) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 46. (A.B. Culvahouse, Counsel to President Reagan, testified that out of 12 lawyers in the White House Counsel's Office, only 2 others were authorized to review the forms. The Deputy White House Counsel and a designated Counsel's Office attorney was authorized to look at judicial forms.)

(67) Former Counsel to President Bush, C. Boyden Gray stated, "The inevitable backlog that results from so many investigations being requested at once requires the Security Office staff to spend 12-14 hour days just to manage the paper flow." Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 4.

(68) 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207.

(69) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 7.

(70) Id., p. 6.

(71) Prepared written statement of Jane Dannenhauer, p. 1 (in committee files).

(72) Each administration since the Nixon administration has followed this procedure.

(73) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 7.

(74) Id., p. 8; Security of FBI Background Files June 19, 1996, p. 50.

(75) Security of FBI Background Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 59.

(76) Prepared written testimony of C. Boyden Gray, p. 8.

(77) Id., p. 9.

(78) Id.

(79) Id., p. 10.

(80) Livingstone, June 14, 1996, p. 38.

(81) Good, June 25, 1996, p. 16.

(82) Id.

(83) Id.

(84) Id., p. 17.

(85) Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 70.

(86) Id.

(87) Id.

(88) Id., p. 82.

(89) Id.

(90) Id., p. 48.

(91) Id., p. 48.

(92) Id., p. 50.

(93) Id., pp. 50-51.

(94) Livingstone remained in the position of Director throughout the tenures of Counsels Bernie Nussbaum, Lloyd Cutler and Abner Mikva. He also outlasted his supervisors and associate counsels William Kennedy, Beth Nolan, and Christopher Cerf.

(95) Livingstone, 3/22/96 dep. p. 14. (See also, the Washington Post, September 9, 1996, pp. A1, A12. The Washington Post reported that a friend of Livingstone's stated that Livingstone's job consisted of posting himself at an escalator in the convention hall and saying "good evening" to VIPs who walked by. "Craig said his job was to meet and greet.")

(96) White House document CGE 46232.

(97) Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996.

(98) Id.

(99) Livingstone SF-86 form completed 2/16/93 to begin his FBI background investigation.

(100) White House document CGE 46231.

(101) Livingstone deposition, p. 12.

(102) During President Bush's speeches figures dressed up as Pinocchio and as a chicken began to appear in the crowd and heckle President Bush.

(103) White House document CGE 46230.

(104) Livingstone deposition, p. 13.

(105) White House document CGE 46230.

(106) Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996, p. 18. (See also, Varney deposition, July 23, 1996 dep., p. 14. Christine Varney, the general counsel of PIC, described Livingstone's position as handling the logistics of transportation to and from the Navy Yard, where PIC was located, as well as handling passes or credentials for PIC employees and volunteers.)

(107) Id.

(108) Id.

(109) Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996, p. 21.

(110) White House document CGE 048536.

(111) Varney deposition, March 23, 1996, p. 15.

(112) Varney deposition, March 23, 1996, p. 18.

(113) Id., pp. 18-20. (See Livingstone deposition. Livingstone, however, stated that it was Varney who told him about the position in the Security office.)

(114) Deposition of Cheryl Mills, August 2, 1996, p. 15.

(115) Varney deposition, p. 19.

(116) Id.

(117) Mills deposition, p. 16.

(118) Id.

(119) Id.

(120) Livingstone, 3/22/95 dep., pp. 22-23.

(121) Mills deposition, p. 16.

(122) White House documents CGE 053841, 046220.

(123) White House document, CGE 48606.

(124) White House document CGE 048606-608.

(125) Id., p. 048608.

(126) Mills deposition, p. 16.

(127) White House document CGE 053841.

(128) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 215.

(129) Id.

(130) Id.

(131) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 56.

(132) Id., pp. 58-59.

(133) Id., p. 170.

(134) Id., p. 172.

(135) Secret Service Documents (unnumbered) (in committee files).

(136) Nussbaum has denied that he ever made the statement. The interviewing agent, Dennis Sculimbrene, does not remember the interview of Mr. Nussbaum, however he stated that his usual practice was to transcribe his notes immediately following any interview.

(137) March 1-3, 1993 interviews with White House supervisors in the course of the FBI background check on Craig Livingstone.

(138) Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 31.

(139) Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 32.

(140) Telephonic staff interview of Gina Gibson.

(141) White House document, CGE 54412.

(142) White House document, CGE 54410.

(143) White House document, CGE 54387. Mr. Livingstone authored a memo to Tricia Northcutt in preparation for this trip requesting numerous sets of Presidential cufflinks, Presidential hats, Presidential pins, Presidential key chains, a ladies stick pin, Presidential pens and Presidential tie bars before he departed on May 23, 1994 for England.

(144) White House document CGE 046220.

(145) Cole, 7/10/96 dep., pp 22-23.

(146) Id., p. 13. Secret Service Agent Arnie Cole is the supervisor of the White House Access Control Branch and as such, primary point of contact for Livingstone in his capacity as Director of the White House Office of Personnel Security. Mr. Livingstone did not receive his temporary pass until February 26, 1993.

(147) Cole deposition, pp. 21-22.

(148) Security of FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, pp. 99-104.

(149) White House document CGE 048543.

(150) White House document CGE 048543.

(151) Mills deposition, August 2, 1996, p. 18.

(152) Deposition of Bruce Lindsey, July 29, 1996, pp. 20-21. (Lindsey was asked whether Livingstone ever approached him about the job in the Military Office. Lindsey stated, "Yes. We did an event at the Library of Congress during the Inaugural and he, I think, was doing an advance on the event, and I was standing outside and he told me that he wanted to be head of the White House Military Office. . . . I asked whether or not it had to be a service person. He indicated it did not. I don't know if I said anything else.")

(153) White House document CGE 046222.

(154) White House document CGE 048543.

(155) Deposition of Chuck Easley, July 26, 1996, p. 42. (Easley stated that the first time he met him, Livingstone told him that he wanted to be the Director of the Military Office. That occurred sometime in early February 1994.)

(156) Thomason deposition, p. 71.

(157) Saunders, 7/13/96, p. 30. (Livingstone told Saunders that the job he really would like to have is head of the Military Office.)

(158) Cole, 7/10/96, pp. 10-11.

(159) Sculimbrene, 7/15/96, p. 53. ("[H]e told me, and as I understood from others, he was looking for another job. He told me he wanted to run the Military Office.")

(160) See, Mills, supra.

(161) Supra note.

(162) Thomason, 5/17/96, pp. 71-72.

(163) Bobbie Faye Ferguson document, BFF 1067.

(164) Aldrich deposition, p. 34.

(165) White House document CGE 46222.

(166) The thank-you note produced to this committee had a cover page attached stating "What should we do with this request?" Below this question is written the word "Nothing" and it is circled. White House document CGE 46221.

(167) White House document CGE 048607.

(168) White House document CGE 048827-829.

(169) Livingstone, June 14, 1996, p. 4.

(170) Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996, pp. 24-25.

(171) Id., p. 26.

(172) Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 34.

(173) White House document CGE 054403.

(174) White House document CGE 048059. (Emphasis added) (May 30, 1995 memo from Craig Livingstone to Abner J. Mikva, re: Follow-up to pay adjustment request.)

(175) Livingstone, March 22, 1996 dep. p. 31.

(176) White House document CGE 054067.

(177) White House document CGE 048523.

(178) White House document CGE 054002 (Letter from Paul Connelly, Chief of Security and Safety Division of the White House Communications Agency to Craig Livingstone dated May 8, 1994. "I was very happy to hear of your mandate and desire to widen your role in White House security and am interested in participating on the White House security committee you mentioned.) (Emphasis added.).

(179) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 23.

(180) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 49. (Livingstone stated: "I think in the first year I looked at a lot of the reports, but as we all got trained in our functions and our mission became clear, we_I trained my staff to look for certain types of information, and if there wasn't any of that type information, that I felt confident that they could make a decision if the information was derogatory or not." He then noted that he did not even train the staff, Lisa Wetzl, a staff assistant did, "I believe it was 1994 when Ms. Wetzl trained our staff." Ms. Wetzl was only 22 years old when she began in the office and in a thank you note to Livingstone, she said it was the first job she ever held.)

(181) White House document CGE 047884. (Memo from Craig Livingstone to William Kennedy, dated May 10, 1993. In the same memo, Livingstone requested that Nancy Gemmell remain on paid status through August 1, 1993. He also asked to bring on a receptionist at a reduced salary of $17,000. "On August 1, 1993 my salary would increase TO $50,000 from $45,000. Based on the reduction of salary for the receptionist.")

(182) White House document CGE 046144.

(183) White House document CGE 048509. (Memo from David Watkins to Beth Nolan dated May 25, 1994, re: salary adjustment. The memo was copied to Patsy Thomasson and Kelli McClure and read, "EYES ONLY")

(184) Id.

(185) White House document CGE 048622. (Memo from Christopher D. Cerf to Phil Lader, Deputy Chief of Staff, re: raise for Craig Livingstone. The memo was copied to Beth Nolan.)

(186) Id.

(187) White House document CGE 048627. (Memo from Joel Klein, Deputy Counsel to the President and Beth Nolan, Associate Counsel to the President dated August 19, 1994, re: raise for Craig Livingstone. The memorandum was marked "Personal and Confidential." The memo was forwarded to Livingstone with a handwritten note from Beth Nolan, "our 3rd effort, it has gone to Phil. Joel will also talk to him.")

(188) Nolan and Klein stated that Livingstone had worked 18 months at "an inadequate salary" of $51,000.

(189) White House document CGE 046217.

(190) White House document CGE 046215. (The document is a "Change in Employee Status" form, change in salary requested by Abner Mikva, dated September 28, 1995.)

(191) White House document CGE 048059. (Livingstone states that at a salary of $57,500 he was living paycheck to paycheck and complains that his predecessor, who had been in the position since the Nixon administration, made over $60,000.)

(192) White House document CGE 048058. (Livingstone also notes that his "situation" had gone on for over 2\1/2\ years, pointing out that he had "seen [the] office through a few storms.")

(193) Attached to the authorization form for the salary increase was a note from Kelli McClure to Deputy Counsel to the President James Castellito, "[t]he increase was approved by Judge Mikva. It is my understanding that it was based on a promise made when Bernie Nussbaum was here." White House document CGE 046216.

(194) White House document CGE 053840. (The increase in salary requested was to $70,000.)

(195) Wetzl deposition, June 17, 1996, p. 7. Ms. Wetzl began as an OPS intern in June 1993, she was hired as a staff assistant in August 1993 and promoted to Executive Assistant in the fall of 1994. Ms. Wetzl left the office in September 1995 to work as a confidential assistant to Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.

(196) Deposition of Edward Hughes, August 13, 1996, p. 6. (Hughes became Livingstone's Executive Assistant in September 1995.)

(197) Deposition of Jonathan Denbo, September 4, 1996, p. 3.

(198) Ann Lewis, This was a simple mistake, USA Today, June 10, 1996, p. A12.

(199) White House documents CGE 043814.

(200) White House documents CGE 043816, letter from Kennedy to Aspin, dated April 13, 1993, re: request for detailee.

(201) Marceca document (unnumbered) calendar of Anthony Marceca dated December 27, 1993; January 7, 1994; January 14, 1994; February 2, 1994; February 3, 1994; February 7, 1994; February 8, 1994; February 25, 1994; and, March 2, 1994.

(202) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 41; Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 60.

(203) Marceca documents (unnumbered). Calendar of Anthony Marceca dated January 20, 1994: "Andrea's first day in Presidential Personnel." It is not clear what his daughter was doing for the office. There was an FBI name check run on her; however, she did not have a White House pass.

(204) Committee interview of Jonathan Denbo, September 4, 1996, p. 17. Mr. Denbo explained that he met Nathan Marceca when he came in to OPS to fill out his new employee paperwork. Mr. Livingstone told Denbo that Nathan was Tony Marceca's son.

(205) Easley deposition, p. 57. Mr. Easley, who replaced Craig Livingstone, stated, "I learned that Mr. Marceca had a temporary volunteer pass that was deactivated May 1995, and since then he has been on the volunteer access list." Mr. Easley removed Marceca's name from the access list on June 21, 1996, after the Secret Service notified him of the name.

(206) White House documents CGE 054248-54275. (The committee did not receive any notice of the contact between the White House and Marceca until a document production on the evening of September 5, 1996. The White House documents had been subpoenaed by the committee and were over 2 weeks late in being produced.)

(207) Marceca deposition, p. 24.

(208) Id.

(209) Id.

(210) See, committee deposition of Dennis Casey, June 20, 1996.

(211) Id., p. 6.

(212) Id.

(213) Id.

(214) Id.

(215) Id., pp. 7-8. Mr. Casey explained that Marceca had entered his office and taken the $200. When Casey approached him the next day, Marceca explained that he needed the cash to get handbills printed and distributed. Mr. Marceca also explained that he needed the money to "pay community children or urchins to distribute the fliers door-to-door." After Casey called the Washington office to inform them of Marceca's actions, Marceca contacted Casey and said, "you guys got me good, right between the eyes."

(216) Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, pp. 25-26.

(217) Id., p. 27.

(218) Id., p. 29.

(219) Id., p. 30.

(220) Id.

(221) Id., p. 34.

(222) Id., p. 35.

(223) Id.

(224) Id., p. 39.

(225) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 22.

(226) Id.

(227) Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 36.

(228) Id., p. 41.

(229) Id.

(230) Id., p. 42.

(231) Id., p. 43.

(232) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, pp. 24-26.

(233) Id., p. 25.

(234) Anthony Marceca document (unnumbered). Calendar of Anthony Marceca, dated March 18, 1993; March 24, 1993.

(235) White House document CGE 043823.

(236) Id.

(237) White House document CGE 043821.

(238) Id.

(239) Id.

(240) Anthony Marceca document (unnumbered). Calendar of Anthony Marceca, dated April 6, 1993.

(241) White House document CGE 043816.

(242) White House document CGE 043819.

(243) Id.

(244) Id.

(245) White House document CGE 043822.

(246) White House document CGE 043818. Detail authorization form for Anthony Marceca.

(247) White House document CGE 047382-3. White House access list.

(248) Security of FBI Files hearings, July 17, 1996, p. 148.

(249) Id., p. 147.

(250) White House document CGE 047382-047631.

(251) Cerf deposition, August 12, 1996, p. 41.

(252) Security of FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 149.

(253) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 129.

(254) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, pp. 38-44.

(255) See generally GAO report on "Personnel Security: Pass & Security Clearance Data for the Executive Office of the President," October 1995.

(256) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 32.

(257) Id., p. 46.

(258) Marceca deposition, p. 83.

(259) Id., p. 60.

(260) Id., p. 153.

(261) Id.

(262) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 38-39. Mrs. Gemmell stayed on in the Clinton administration until August 13, 1993 to assist in training the new staff.

(263) Anthony Marceca document (unnumbered). Handwritten notes of Anthony Marceca dated August 9, 1993.

(264) Marceca deposition, p. 61.

(265) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 90.

(266) Id.

(267) Marceca document production (unnumbered). Handwritten notes dated August 9, 1993.

(268) White House document CGE 053677. Although the memorandum is undated, the information contained within clearly indicates that it was created in March 1993.

(269) Id., pp. 94-95.

(270) Wetzl deposition, p. 33.

(271) Marceca deposition, p. 98.

(272) Telephonic interview of Nancy Gemmell.

(273) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 50-51.

(274) Id.,p. 94.

(275) Denbo interview, September 4, 1996, p. 9.

(276) Marceca deposition, p. 40.

(277) Marceca document production (unnumbered). Handwritten notes dated August 9, 1993.

(278) Wetzl deposition, pp. 20-21. (A.B. Culvahouse, Counsel to President Reagan, testified before the committee that during his tenure only the White House Counsel, his Deputy and the Director of the Security Office were authorized to review the SF-86 forms. Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 46.)

(279) Id., p. 21.

(280) Marceca deposition, p. 59.

(281) Id.

(282) Livingstone deposition, p. 33.

(283) Id., p. 37.

(284) Id., p. 39.

(285) Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 59.

(286) Livingstone deposition, June 17, 1996, p. 33. (When asked who supervised the project Livingstone stated, "I believe Ms. Gemmell, Ms. Anderson, Ms. Wetzl and Mr. Marceca." Ms. Gemmell had started the very first stages of the project before she retired. Ms. Wetzl began working on the project after she was promoted to Executive Assistant in late 1994, when she felt that she had enough authority to do so. See Wetzl deposition, p. 66. Ms. Anderson apparently never worked on the project at all.)

(287) Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 6.

(288) Id.

(289) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 90-91.

(290) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 90.

(291) Marceca deposition, p. 61.

(292) Id., p. 62.

(293) Id., p. 66. (Later in the deposition Marceca is asked whether there came a time when he discovered that there were people who were not properly on those lists. Marceca answered, "Not to my knowledge, [to] the time I left, no." Marceca deposition, p. 73.)

(294) Id., p. 98.

(295) Id., p. 100.

(296) Marceca document production. (Unnumbered.) Handwritten notes dated August 9, 1993.

(297) See infra Section VII, for further clarification of the Secret Service lists.

(298) Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996 p. 67.

(299) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 41.

(300) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 39. Mr. Marceca's hearing testimony is contrary to his deposition testimony in which he stated that he used only one list for the Update Project. Marceca deposition, p. 61.

(301) Id.

(302) Id.

(303) Id.

(304) Id., p. 41.

(305) Id., p. 39. This is the same task which, in previous administrations, only the counsel, deputy counsel and the director of the Security Office were authorized to conduct.

(306) Id., p. 40.

(307) Id. The "dead bin" was a bin located in the vault which was empty at the time Marceca began his detail.

(308) Id., p. 40.

(309) Id.

(310) Id., p. 41. In his deposition testimony Marceca stated that he did not see any lists which were divided by office until January.

(311) Id., p. 106.

(312) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 50. Ms. Gemmell testified, "It was very much understood that the initial list the office had was just that, an initial list to be used to start the first steps of the Update Project. It was very well-known that many personnel decisions had yet to be made and therefore that follow-up would have to be done."

(313) Id., pp. 284-286. (In his deposition testimony Marceca directly contradicts this statement, when asked whether there came a time when he discovered that there were people who were not properly on those lists. Marceca answered, "Not to my knowledge, [to] the time I left, no." Marceca deposition, p. 73.)

(314) Id., p. 194.

(315) Id., pp. 193-94.

(316) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 83-84.

(317) Marceca deposition, p. 65. In his testimony during a committee hearing, Marceca testified that he worked from the list, not from SF-86 forms. Security of FBI Files, June 26, 1996, pp. 40-42.

(318) Marceca deposition, p. 99.

(319) Id.

(320) Id., p. 100.

(321) Id., p. 64.

(322) Marceca stated that one day he saw Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary for President Bush, in the White House complex.

(323) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 54.

(324) Wetzl deposition, p. 26. When asked to describe what she observed Marceca doing on the Update project, Wetzl answered, "I knew he was working on it, you know, and we were all in the same office so, you know, I would see him at his work station but I really didn't get involved in the details of what he was doing." (Emphasis added).

(325) Marceca document production, Bates Stamp Nos. 000096, 000155. In the first memo from Marceca to Livingstone, Marceca writes, "White House Staff; 50 Requests for Backgrounds were sent this week and the previous 3 weeks to FBI. 50 Requests for Backgrounds are awaiting to be sent next Monday to FBI. (We are at the `D' with this project.) Next week; 1 Jan. 94, re investigation begins on GSA; AT&T; NSC; Credit Union; and "White House Staff, for BI's which expire in 1989." In the second memo, under Re-investigations of White House Staff, Marceca writes, "White House Staff Update: 43 Request for Previous backgrounds were this week. 50 each for the previous 5 weeks to FBI. 50 Request for backgrounds are awaiting to be sent next Monday to FBI. 250 Request for Previous Reports sent during this reporting period. (We are at the `F' with the Staff Update Project.").

(326) Marceca document production, Bates Stamp Nos. 000004-000081. Lists created by Anthony Marceca dated from September 24, 1993 through February 10, 1994.

(327) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 12. Mr. Livingstone was asked about the layout of OPS, he answered, "In 1993, it was one large room." All of the staff members of the office worked in the same room. Id.

(328) See, Livingstone deposition, Wetzl deposition and Marceca deposition.

(329) See, Security of FBI Files hearing, June 24, 1996, pp. 40-41. Mr. Marceca explains that he does not have a vivid recollection of the list which he used; Livingstone explained that he was not clear on the details of the Update Project; however, it appeared that whatever list Marceca was using caused the problem. Id., pp. 30-33; Ms. Wetzl testified, "I saw that it was a Secret Service list . . . I didn't look at in detail, so I couldn't tell you what_which format this list was in." Wetzl deposition, p. 34.

(330) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 24, 1996, p. 113. Wetzl stated, "I did not work with her list. I threw it out."

(331) Wetzl deposition, p. 45.

(332) Among his other duties, Marceca's calendars show that on at least two occasions he was summoned by Counsel to the President Bernard Nussbaum's secretary to crack open Nussbaum's safe.

(333) Marceca document production.

(334) See, Wetzl deposition, p. 36. Ms. Wetzl was asked whether there were any attempts to re-detail Marceca to OPS. She answered, "I don't know. There was talk of it, but I'm not_I wasn't involved in it."

(335) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996 p. 60.

(336) Id., pp. 60-61.

(337) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 41.

(338) White House production CGE 043810. The document is a form entitled "White House Office PERSONNEL FROM OTHER AGENCIES. It is signed by William H. Kennedy, III and dated February 28, 1994.

(339) White House production CGE 054258. Message from Kelli McClure, White House Personnel Liaison for Management and Administration, to Craig Livingstone, dated March 8, 1994 at 3:40.

(340) Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 150.

(341) Id., pp. 151-52.

(342) Letter from Livingstone to Secretary of Defense Perry, dated 3/17/94; White House production 55749.

(343) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 43.

(344) Marceca deposition, p. 152.

(345) Marceca v. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, p. 10 (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994).

(346) See, Marceca v. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994), deposition p. 10.

(347) Marceca v. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994), deposition exhibit, FBI 302 dated October 29, 1993.

(348) Marceca deposition, p. 153.

(349) Id.

(350) Id.

(351) White House production CGE 054252. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated May 18, 1994 at 10:25 a.m.

(352) White House production CGE 054255. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated May 12, 1994 at 9 a.m.

(353) White House production CGE 054254. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated June 28, 1994 at 9:05 a.m.

(354) White House production CGE 054249. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated January 11, 1995 at 1:41 p.m.

(355) White House production CGE 054265. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated September 13, 1995 at 10:43 a.m.

(356) White House production CGE 054248. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated December 19, 1995 at 11:43.

(357) Marceca v. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994), deposition of Anthony Marceca, February 20, 1995, pp. 114-17.

(358) White House production CGE 054268. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone, dated October 6, 1996 at 12:35.

(359) White House production CGE 054271. Message from "Marvin" to Craig Livingstone, dated December 16, 1994 at 11:42.

(360) Marceca v. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994)

(361) Mr. Marceca's own handwritten notes show that he was aware that he was responsible for instructing the Secret Service to deactivate prior administration staff. Marceca document production (unnumbered). Handwritten notes of Anthony Marceca, dated August 9, 1993.

(362) Wetzl deposition, pp. 41-43. Ms. Wetzl knew about the row of files which the office referred to as "Tony's row" or "Tony's files." She was not aware that the files were of prior Republican administration officials until she began to review the files in the fall. Id., p. 67.

(363) Wetzl deposition, p. 65. Ms. Wetzl stated, "The row after row 15 was separate. That was Tony's stuff, Tony's project. We called it Tony's row."

(364) Edward Hughes interview, August 13, 1996, p. 17.

(365) Marlin Fitzwater was President Bush's Press Secretary and Deputy Press Secretary to President Reagan.

(366) Wetzl deposition, p. 43.

(367) Id., p. 63.

(368) Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, pp. 81-83.

(369) Id., p. 81.

(370) Id., pp. 81-83.

(371) Wetzl deposition, p. 66.

(372) Wetzl deposition, pp. 67-68.

(373) Williams deposition, July 31, 1996, p. 24.

(374) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 81.

(375) Id., p. 7.

(376) Id., p. 10.

(377) Id.

(378) Id.

(379) Id., p. 14.

(380) Id., p. 15. After Lisa Wetzl left the Office of Personnel Security, Jonathan Denbo, a recent college graduate, took over the responsibility of reviewing the SF-86 forms. Jonathan Denbo interview, September 4, 1996, p. 5.

(381) Id.

(382) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 46.

(383) Id.

(384) Id., p. 38. During the Ford/Carter transition, Ms. Dannenhauer and one of her assistants remained for 2\1/2\ months to train the new staff members and await a new Director, thereby ensuring a smooth transition.

(385) Id., p. 82.

(386) Security of FBI Files, hearing, June 26, 1996 p. 138.

(387) White House document production, CGE 54939.

(388) Letter from FBI general counsel, Howard Shapiro to Chairman Clinger, July 24, 1996.

(389) White House document production, CGE 54392.

(390) Deposition of Gary Aldrich, 7/18/96, p. 53. In response to committee questioning, Agent Aldrich described an instance in which:

There was a staff member who contended that the information on the FBI summary was incorrect. It was on a case that I completed, and communication was made to me first about this, I think. This individual worked in the Security Office. . . . .

Well, there was a contention, about information that I had submitted, that the information contained in the report was incorrect. I was asked to_essentially, I was asked to go back and review this in the context that if I could_if I could see that it could be possible that it was incorrect, could I change it? This was spoken to me by Craig Livingstone.

I never had a request like this before, and so I went back to my_to the case file and I pulled the report. I reviewed whatever material was in the file that could help me make a determination. After I reviewed the material, I could not determine that I had made an error, and so I reported back to Mr. Livingstone that I had reviewed the material; I didn't think I made an error.

He then spoke to_either spoke to Jim Bourke or to Tom Renaghan or both about this, contending that the matter, in his opinion was not settled.

I was then contacted by my supervisor, Tom Renaghan, who asked me once again to review it. I reviewed it. I suggested to him that there was no change that I could make, and that is the_that was the end as far as I knew. I have since learned that an agent was directed to come to the White House to reinterview the person. . . . Agent Greg Schwarz. And I can't tell you what happened after that, but I do know that this person had since moved shortly thereafter to another agency. Aldrich deposition, pp. 68-69.

(391) Wetzl deposition, p. 8.

(392) July 24, 1996 letter from Howard Shapiro to Chairman Clinger.

(393) Marceca deposition, p. 153.

(394) Wetzl deposition, p. 66.

(395) Wetzl deposition, p. 66.

(396) Id.

(397) Id., p. 41.

(398) Id.

(399) Id., p. 43.

(400) Wetzl deposition, p. 43.

(401) Id.

(402) Id., p. 58.

(403) Id.

(404) Id.

(405) Wetzl deposition, p. 59. Ms. Wetzl testified, "Nancy, like I said before, had briefly tried to explain to me before her impending departure how to do everything, and it was my understanding that we wanted to put in storage, it all had to go to Records Management; Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, pp. 137-138. Mr. Livingstone testified, "Sir, I am glad you asked that question. The only information that I ever got_and I can't speak for the rest of the people here, of course_the only information I ever got about what we were to do with FBI files was to safeguard them, ensure that they were remanded to Records Management at the end of the administration . . . We were never instructed to return materials back to the FBI."

(406) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 138.

(407) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996 p. 46.

(408) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, pp. 46-47.

(409) White House Access to FBI Summaries: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 28, 1996 pp. 167-171.

(410) Deposition of Lisa Wetzl, p. 59.

(411) Deposition of Lisa Wetzl, p. 53.

(412) Id.

(413) Id., p. 55.

(414) Id., p. 63.

(415) Id., p. 58.

(416) White House document production, CGE 42825-42827. The memorandum only asks for documents "created as of May 31, 1995" to be provided to the committee and provides a limited definition of the "White House Travel Office matter" for purposes of determining which documents are responsive.

(417) Natalie Williams deposition, p. 19.

(418) Handwritten memorandum of Tom Taggart, Jr., December 27, 1995, produced to the committee in a July 18, 1996 letter from Jane Sherburne to Chairman Clinger.

(419) Letter from Jack Quinn, Chief White House Counsel, to William F. Clinger, Jr., June 10, 1996.

(420) Deposition of Jane Sherburne, July 23, 1996 p. 71.

(421) White House document DF 780643-654, task list created by Jane Sherburne.

(422) Statement of Wendy S. White concerning production of Billy Dale FBI file, July 18, 1996.

(423) Statement of Wendy S. White concerning production of Billy Dale FBI file, July 18, 1996.

(424) July 18, 1996 letter from Special Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne to Chairman Clinger.

(425) Id.

(426) Williams deposition, p. 18.

(427) Jane Sherburne letter, July 18, 1996.

(428) Statement of William F. Clinger, Jr., June 5, 1996.

(429) The FBI file, itself, was never made public by the committee. However, before the White House finally released documents to the committee in compliance with the subpoena, it made many of the 1,000 pages of documents available to the press. The committee has been unable to ascertain whether sensitive, background information on Billy Dale was included in the materials made available to the press.

(430) Kelley deposition, pp. 22-23

(431) Id.

(432) Id.

(433) Id.

(434) Id., pp. 23-25.

(435) Id., pp. 23-25.

(436) Id., p. 27.

(437) Id.

(438) Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File Information to the White House, June 14, 1996, at charts tab 16. According to a report written by Shapiro, in the first year of the Clinton administration, the actual number of files requested by the White House was 10,197, more than 3 times the number requested the previous year by the Bush administration. The average number of files requested by the Clinton administration each month was 850, more than 3 times the monthly average of Bush administration requests.

(439) Deposition of Howard M. Shapiro, July 30, 1996, p. 29.

(440) Id., p. 29.

(441) Deposition of Thomas A. Kelley, pp. 43-44.

(442) Shapiro deposition, p. 28.

(443) Shapiro deposition, p. 25.

(444) Id.

(445) Id., p. 24.

(446) Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File Information to the White House, June 14, 1996. Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(447) Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File Information to the White House, June 14, 1996. For statistical details of increase in file request from the Clinton administration, see supra at note 13.

(448) It is important to note that the Clinton administration underwent a much hailed 25 percent cut in White House staff. Therefore, the number of requests for current reports should have lessened the demand placed on the FBI's White House desk.

(449) Statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 14, 1996.

(450) Tim Weiner; Request for Files "Victimized" FBI, It's Director Says; New York Times, June 15, 1996.

(451) McGrory, Boston Globe, June 10, 1996.

(452) Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File Information to the White House, June 14, 1996.

(453) Id., p. 16.

(454) Id., p. 18.

(455) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, pp. 71-72.

(456) Bourke deposition, pp. 24-25.

(457) George deposition, p. 34.

(458) Associated Press, Reno Orders FBI File Probe, June 19, 1996.

(459) Shapiro deposition, p. 120. Mr. Shapiro also testified that he met with the Office of Independent Counsel and received a briefing on the Independent Counsel's investigation.

(460) Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(1) of the initiation of a preliminary investigation and application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C § (c)(1) for the expansion of the jurisdiction of an Indepenent Counsel; June 21, 1996.

(461) Statement of Attorney General Janet Reno, June 20, 1996.

(462) Reneghan deposition, pp. 62-65.

(463) July 10, 1996 letter from Director Freeh to Chairman Clinger.

(464) Id.

(465) Id.

(466) July 29, 1996 interview of Howard M. Shapiro by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

(467) Kelley deposition, pp. 85-86.

(468) Special Agent Dennis Sculimbrene, memorandum of interviews conducted between March 1, 1993 and March 3, 1993. The memorandum includes descriptions of interviews of Lori Stallings, Supervisory Personnel Assistant in the White House; Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President; and William Holden Kennedy, III, Associate Counsel to the President. Mr. Kennedy sought assurances from Sculimbrene that any recommendation Kennedy made regarding Livingstone was made "on the short period of time that he has known [Livingstone]." Kennedy also mentioned to Sculimbrene that Livingstone sought the position of head of the White House Military Office.

(469) Security of FBI Background Files hearings, June 26, 1996, p. 170.

(470) Interview of Howard Shapiro; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary; July 29, 1996, p. 11.

(471) Shapiro deposition, pp. 63-64.

(472) Id.

(473) Interview of Howard Shapiro; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary; July 29, 1996, p. 17.

(474) Id., p. 12.

(475) Id., p. 12.

(476) Shapiro deposition, pp. 104-106.

(477) Statement of William F. Clinger, Jr., chairman, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, August 1, 1996.

(478) Sherburne deposition, pp. 222-223.

(479) Id.

(480) Id.

(481) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, pp. 93-94.

(482) Id.

(483) Shapiro deposition, pp. 70-71.

(484) Id.

(485) Id., p. 72.

(486) Supervisory Special Agent Duncan J. Wainwright and Special Agent Jennifer Esposito, Federal Bureau of Investigation 302 Interview of Special Agent M. Dennis Sculimbrene, Washington, DC, July 16, 1996.

(487) Id.

(488) Statment of William F. Clinger, Jr., chairman, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives, August 1, 1996.

(489) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1,1996, pp. 91-92.

(490) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, p. 46.

(491) Id., p. 82.

(492) Id., pp. 157-158.

(493) Id., p. 113.

(494) Id.

(495) Security of FBI Files hearings, p. 114.

(496) Id., p. 115.

(497) Shapiro deposition, p. 59.

(498) Id.

(499) Security of FBI Files hearings, June 26, 1996, p. 57.

(500) Id.

(501) Sculimbrene memo contained in the FBI background file of Craig Livingstone.

(502) Congressional Record, July 25, 1996, pp. H8520-H8521

(503) Letter to the Honorable Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel, from Chairman Clinger and members of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; July 30, 1996.

(504) Shapiro deposition, p. 150.

(505) Letter from White House Counsel Jack Quinn to FBI Director Louis Freeh, July 25, 1996.

(506) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, p. 137.

(507) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, pp. 176-177.

(508) Pub.L. 90-351, Title VI, § 1101, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 236, as amended by Pub. L. 94-503, Title II, § 203, October 15, 1976, 90 Stat. 2427.

(509) Ronald J. Ostrow, Freeh Reign He's Eliminated Red Tape and Senior Posts, Given Agents More Power and Fewer Desk Jobs, Promoted International Cooperation and His Friends_In Just 17 Months, Louis Freeh has Made a Mark on the FBI as Indelible as J. Edgar Hoover's, the Los Angeles Times Magazine, Sunday, February 5, 1995.

(510) Id.

(511) Deposition of Howard Shapiro, 7/30/96, p. 10.

(512) Id., p. 11.

(513) Id., p. 12.

(514) Id.

(515) Id., p. 13. Mr. Shapiro described this as a "somewhat delicate personnel matter" that Director Freeh had to move out the current Assistant Director who served as the Director of the Office of Legal Counsel Division before Shapiro could "replace" him. Then Assistant Director Joe Davis thereafter retired from the FBI after a long and distinguished career with the Bureau.

(516) Id., p. 15.

(517) Director Freeh sent a letter on May 25, 1994 to Craig Livingstone requesting that Shapiro receive a permanent OGA White House pass. Director Freeh cited the numerous meetings Shapiro attends at the White House complex: "no fewer than 14 meetings within the White House gates, including a meeting with the President" over the past month. We believe that no other FBI legal advisor or general counsel has required such access to the White House complex in the past.

(518) This is not a credible statement, given that Shapiro was a professor at Cornell University before taking a leave of absence to work for his mentor and good friend, Louis Freeh. Shapiro is an SES employee appointed by Director Freeh as a result of his appointment by the Clinton White House.

(519) Shapiro deposition, p. 125.

(520) Security of the FBI Files, hearing, August 1, 1996, p. 33.

(521) Letter to Mr. Jay Stephens, attorney for Agent Gary Aldrich; January 4, 1996. OPCA maintains liaison with the authors of the submitted manuscripts_and formally advises them, within 30 working days, whether, or under what conditions, approval for publication is granted (as per responses from the substantive agencies).

(522) Letter to Howard Shapiro, general counsel of the FBI, from Lisa Kate Osofsky, deputy general counsel of the FBI, July 31, 1996.

(523) Shapiro deposition, July 30, 1996, p. 82.

(524) Letter from Shapiro to Chairman Clinger, July 19, 1996.

(525) Shapiro deposition, p. 88.

(526) Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, p. 33.

(527) Id., pp. 58-59

(528) Letter to Howard Shapiro, general counsel of the FBI, from Lisa Kate Osofsky, deputy general counsel of the FBI, July 31, 1996.

(529) Security of FBI Files hearings, p. 125.

(530) Security of FBI Files hearings, pp. 125-126.

(531) Mills deposition, pp. 70-80.

(532) Cerf deposition, pp. 89-95.

(533) Letter from Sherburne to committee Chief Investigative Counsel Barbara Olson, September 10, 1996.

(534) Letter from John Collingwood to Jack Quinn, dated September 18, 1996.

(535) Shapiro deposition, p. 18.

(536) White House Admits Having Background Files, the Washington Post, June 8, 1996, p. A1.

(537) Id., at 1:41 p.m.

(538) "White House Admits Having Background Files," the Washington Post, June 8, 1996.

(539) "Panetta Offers Apology Over Files `Mistake' ", the Washington Post, June 10, 1996.

(540) Confidential memorandum from Craig Livingstone to William Kennedy, undated. Livingstone refers to the date on which the green/tan access badges will expire as March 15, 1993. From this information, the committee believes the date of this memorandum to be between March 4, 1993 and March 15, 1993.

(541) May 19, 1993 memo from Craig Livingstone to Arnold Cole, CGE 33034.

(542) Security of FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, pp. 46-47.

(543) Cole deposition, pp. 41-42.

(544) Security of the FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 47.

(545) Id., pp. 24-41.

(546) White House Access to FBI Summaries; hearing before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d. Sess., June 28, 1996 p. 111.

(547) Cole deposition, p. 38.

(548) Id., p. 184.

(549) Security of the FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 44.

(550) Id., pp. 24-41.

(551) Id. Opening statement of Agent Libonati.

(552) Id., p. 25.

(553) Id., pp. 27-28; On August 23, 1996, William H. Pickle, Executive Assistant to the Director of the Secret Service, wrote to Chairman Clinger to explain why the Secret Service retains 8 years worth of inactive passholder records. He wrote, "In April of 1982, a study was conducted by the Secret Service Office of Management and Organization. The study concluded that due to a recurring need for information in these files, an 8-year retention period would be recommended to the National Archives for review. The request was reviewed and approved by Archives appraisers in January of 1983."

(554) Thus, Secret Service Records would include the names and status of those who held White House passes for 8 years.

(555) Security of FBI Files hearings, June 26, 1996, p. 30.

(556) Id., p. 47.

(557) Memorandum from Craig Livingstone, Director of White House Security to Arnold Cole; "Please place the following people on restricted access. They are restricted from gaining access to the White House Complex without written authorization of Mr. David Watkins." Document CGE 33034; May 19, 1993.

(558) Security of the FBI File hearing, July 17, 1996, pp. 24-41.

(559) Id., p. 25. (Emphasis in original.)

(560) Id., pp. 24-41.

(561) Id., p. 25.

(562) Id., pp. 33-34.

(563) Id., p. 34.

(564) Id., p. 34.

(565) Id., p. 35.

(566) Id.

(567) Id., pp. 35-36.

(568) Cole deposition, pp. 47-48.

(569) Security of the FBI Files hearing, July 26, 1996.

(570) Id., p. 27. (Emphasis added.)

(571) Memorandum from Craig Livingstone, Director of White House Security; Re: deactivation of Senator Tower; May 27, 1993. "Please deactivate the pass issued to Senator Tower." CGE 047989.

(572) Confidential memorandum from Craig Livingstone, Chief of White House Security, to William Kennedy, Associate White House Counsel, undated. Within the memorandum, Livingstone refers to a crash of the WAVE computer system occurring on March 4, 1993. Livingstone refers to the date on which "green/tan access badge[s]" will expire as March 15, 1993. From this information, the committee believes the date of this memorandum to be between March 4, 1993 and March 15, 1993.

(573) Anthony Marceca, notes from meeting with Nancy Gemmell, August 9, 1993.

(574) GAO report to Congress, "Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive Office of the President," October 19, 1995.

(575) The GAO inquiry which was requested in March 1994 was still stalled in October 1994 when Chairman Clinger, Representative Wolf and Representative Goss wrote to White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta on October 7, 1994 concerned about the delay in the investigation.

(576) GAO report, p. 21.

(577) Staff interview with Jane Dannenhauer.

(578) GAO report, p. 28.

(579) GAO report, p. 29.

(580) GAO report, p. 22.

(581) GAO report, p. 22.

(582) GAO report, p. 21.

(583) GAO report, p. 29.

(584) GAO report, p. 34.

(585) GAO report, p. 3.

(586) Id.

(587) White House production CGE 047029. Memorandum for U.S. Secret Service Pass Section from White House Security, Re: extension of passes, December 13, 1993.

(588) Representative Frank Wolf began inquiring about the delays in White House passes and the lack of procedures being followed with passes in July 1993. Throughout the fall of 1993 and into 1994, then-Chief of Staff Mack McLarty assured Wolf that clearances were being handled "in a timely manner."

(589) "Who is Patsy Thomasson?" Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1994.

(590) Memorandum to Thomas F. McLarty from William H. Kennedy III, re: procedures to receive a permanent pass, March 10, 1994, CGE 054752.

(591) "After Year, 15 White House Aides Have Yet to Receive Security Clearances,

" the Washington Post, March 11, 1994.

(592) "White House lags badly on background checks," the Washington Times, March 12, 1994.

(593) Id.

(594) "100 on White House Staff Lack Clearance," the Washington Post, March 14, 1994.

(595) See letters to Rep. Frank Wolf from Mack McLarty dated August 19, 1993, October 27, 1993 and February 24, 1994.

(596) Staff interview of Jane Dannenhauer.

(597) GAO report, p. 21.

(598) GAO documents prepared for GAO report, January 5, 1995. (In committee files).

(599) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 4:

(600) February 26, 1993 memo to Mr. Brekke from Mr. Bourke regarding "Meeting with William Kennedy, Associate Counsel, the White House, February 18, 1993. (FBI document production, July 10, 1996, unnumbered.)

(601) Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 9.

(602) "Patsy Takes the Fiske," Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1994.

(603) CGE 054658, undated document titled "Deconcini" with questions and answers, CGE 54654-662.

(604) Ann Devroy, 100 on White House Staff Lack Clearance, the Washington Post, March 14, 1994.

(605) Three attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office wrote letters requesting a raise for Craig Livingstone, even though there was a salary freeze. CGE 048622, 048627; Mr. Livingstone wrote several letters to Abner Mikva requesting a raise, stating, "[T]his is my last try to remain part of the team." CGE 048058; See, supra section III.

(606) Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 32. (Testimony of A.B. Culvahouse.)

(607) Howard M. Shapiro, general counsel, FBI; Report of the General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI FIle Information to the White House; June 14, 1996. (Statement of FBI Director Louis Freeh).

(608) Id.

(609) Howard M. Shapiro, general counsel, FBI; Report of the General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI FIle Information to the White House; June 14, 1996.

(610) "The FBI Files Flap: Take 2," the Washington Post, June 17, 1996.

(611) Renaghan deposition, July 19, 1996, pp. 62-65.

(612) Cole deposition, July 10, 1996, pp. 21-22.

(613) August 11, 1994 letter to the President from Senator DeConcini.

(614) GAO report, p. 15.

(615) Easley deposition, July 26, 1996.

(616) GAO report.

(617) GAO report, p. 15.

(618) GAO report, p. 15.

(619) GAO report, p. 15.

(620) GAO report, p. 16.

(621) Easley deposition, p. 48.

(622) Easley deposition, pp. 48-50.

(623) GAO report, p. 16.

(624) GAO report, p. 16.

(625) GAO report, p. 16.

(626) GAO report, p. 17.

(627) GAO report, p. 18.

(628) Patsy Takes the Fiske, the Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1994.

(629) Id.

(630) Id.

(631) Sculimbrene deposition, July 15, 1996, p. 28.

(632) Id., p. 29.

(633) Id.

(634) Renaghan deposition, pp. 13-15.

(635) Woods deposition, July 10, 1996, pp. 20-22.

(636) Schwarz deposition, July 11, 1996, pp. 27-30.

(637) Woods deposition, July 10, 1996, pp. 22-23.

(638) Id., p. 61.

(639) Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 20.

(640) Memorandum to all White House Office Staff from Vincent Foster and William Kennedy, CGE 048210.

(641) FBI document production, July 10, 1996 (unnumbered). March 1, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke; April 7, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke; October 20, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke.

(642) April 7, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke.

(643) Sculimbrene deposition, July 15, 1996, p. 42.

(644) Id.

(645) Id., p. 43.

(646) Id., p. 44.

(647) Woods deposition, p. 29.

(648) Cole deposition, p. 18

(649) Id., p. 6.

(650) Id., p. 8.

(651) Id., p. 10.

(652) Id., p. 15.

(653) Id., p. 17.

(654) Deposition of Arnold Cole, July 10, 1996, p. 25.

(655) Deposition of Arnold Cole, July 10, 1996, p. 18.

(656) Id., p. 19.

(657) GAO draft of data for GAO report, 1/5/95.

(658) Id.

(659) November 7, 1993 event report to Montgomery County Police of threat to Barbara Ann Sable by Craig Livingstone, #B93-240485.

(660) Id.

(661) Cole deposition, pp. 21-22.

(662) Id., pp. 22-23.

(663) Id., pp. 24-25.

(664) Id., p. 41.

(665) Undercoffer deposition, p. 42.

(666) Cole deposition, p. 31.

(667) Id., p. 32.

(668) Cole and Undercoffer depositions.

(669) Cole deposition, p. 32.

(670) July 31, 1996 letter to Chairman Clinger from Jack Quinn.

(671) Id.

(672) July 31, 1996 letter to Chairman Clinger from Jack Quinn.

(673) Id.

(674) June 10, 1993, "Assignment from Bill Kennedy & Craig Livingstone," CGE 047888.

(675) Id.

(676) CIA documents, located in committee files.

(677) Easley deposition, p. 72.

(678) Id.

(679) It should be noted that neither Ms. Gemmell nor Jane Dannenhauer, Mr. Livingstone's predecessor, had any background in security issues.

(680) It is ironic that in light of the majority's repeated claims of stonewalling by the administration, Mr. Aldrich refused to answer under oath more than 30 questions asked by minority counsel regarding statements he made in his book. Rather than assisting in this committee's efforts to obtain relevant information regarding the credibility of a witness, majority staff also obstructed the minority's efforts to have these questions answered by Mr. Aldrich.

In a letter dated August 2, 1996, Ranking Minority Member Collins subsequently requested Chairman Clinger to instruct Mr. Aldrich to respond to these 36 questions. To date, he has not responded.